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ABSTRACT 
Intellectual property’s road to hell is paved with good intentions.  Because 
liability is difficult to predict, intellectual property users often seek licenses even 
when proceeding without one might be permissible.  Yet because the existence 
(vel non) of licensing markets plays a key role in determining the breadth of 
rights, these seemingly sensible licensing decisions eventually feed back into 
doctrine; the licensing itself becomes proof that the entitlement covers the use.  
Over time, then, public privilege recedes and rights expand, moving intellectual 
property’s ubiquitous gray areas into what used to be virgin territoryCwhere 
risk aversion again creates licensing markets, which cause further accretion of 
entitlements, which in turn push the gray areas even farther afield, and so on.  
This “doctrinal feedback” is not a result of changes in the positive law (the 
scholarship’s usual focus), but is instead rooted in longstanding, widely 
accepted doctrine and prudent behavior on the part of everyone involved.  
Because feedback is so ingrained in established law and practice, its various 
cures tend to create more problems than they solve.  There exists, however, one 
promising solutionCsubtle changes in doctrine’s use of licensing 
informationCthat can keep intellectual property market-referential without 
making it market-reverential. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Agree, for the Law is costly. CWilliam Camden, 16051
Intellectual property law is a growth industry.  It covers an ever-expanding 
variety of subject matters, its protection lasts longer than ever, and its 
entitlements increasingly intrude into realms of conduct once reserved for public 
use.  The blame (or, more rarely, credit) for this incessant growth usually falls 
on the agents of positive lawCcourts and legislaturesCand the rent-seeking 
rightsholders who influence them. 
But when it comes to one aspect of this expansion, the increasing breadth of 
intellectual property rights, much of the responsibility lies not with positive 
law’s usual suspects, but with an organic, inadvertent process that results from 
the interaction of indeterminate doctrine and risk-averse licensing.  Copyright 
law provides the best example.  The copyright doctrines that determine where 
private entitlement ends and public privilege begins are inherently ambiguous.  
This means that those who want to make use of copyrighted material cannot 
make accurate ex ante judgments regarding the need to secure a license from the 
rightsholder.  Yet making the wrong call can be costly, because the penalties for 
infringement typically include supracompensatory damages and injunctive 
relief.  Combine these doctrinal gray areas and severe consequences with the 
risk aversion that pervades key copyright industries, and the result is a practice 
of securing copyright licenses even when none is needed.  Better safe than sued. 
In and of itself this state of affairs is unobjectionable, even laudable, in that 
the market provides certainty where the law does not.  But licensing markets are 
not only the end result of legal doctrine; they are also instrumental in 
determining the reach of copyright entitlements.  If a rightsholder can show that 
it routinely issues licenses for a given use, then copyright law views that use as 
properly falling within the rightsholder’s control.  Thus the practice of licensing 
within gray areas eventually makes those areas less gray, as the licensing itself 
becomes the proof that the entitlement covers the use.  Over time, public 
privilege recedes and the reach of copyright expands, moving the ubiquitous 
gray areas farther into what used to be virgin territory, which in turn creates 
more licensing markets, which in turn push the gray area even farther afield, and 
so on.  Lather, rinse, repeat. 
This phenomenon, which I call “doctrinal feedback,” is unappreciated in the 
intellectual property literature and unrecognized in the courts.  Scholars and 
judges focus instead on top-down developments in the positive lawCfederal 
statutes, Supreme Court opinions, and so forthCnever imagining that major 
transformations in the law could emerge from the bottom up, through 
practitioners’ everyday application of longstanding, uncontroversial principles.  
 
1. WILLIAM CAMDEN, REMAINS CONCERNING BRITAIN 316 (EP Publishing 1974) (1605). 
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For example, everyone agrees that certain copyright doctrines are ambiguous, 
and this ambiguity can be advantageous because it allows courts to reach 
equitable results despite substantial variation and complexity in the fact patterns 
they encounter.2 Everyone also agrees that licensing practice should play a key 
role in determining whether a given use falls within copyright’s entitlement.  
Indeed, agreement on this issue unites otherwise disparate camps in copyright 
scholarship.3 Finally, everyone agrees that it is usually in a user’s best interest 
to secure a license rather than take even a small risk of an adverse judgment; the 
simple reality is that finding out whether permission is required usually costs 
more than getting permission.  But because these propositions are so 
uncontroversial, no one has noticed that their aggregate effect is an expansion in 
the reach of intellectual property rightsCan expansion completely unconnected 
to lobbying successes and courtroom victories. 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that intellectual property’s growth is due 
entirely to seemingly sensible doctrines and prudent behavior on the part of 
everyone involved.  Much of the recent expansion is obviously the result of 
purposeful policy decisions by courts and legislaturesCand in certain areas such 
positivist decisions provide the entire explanation (e.g., expansions in the 
subject matter and duration of rights).  But doctrinal feedback is its own animal, 
quietly contributing to the seemingly ceaseless growth of intellectual property, 
without relying on developments in legislation or litigation, on strategic 
behavior in the marketplace, or on rent-seeking initiatives by moneyed interests. 
 In other words, even if intellectual property owners are guileless or have no 
interest in gaming the system, and even if statutes and case law are not overly 
favorable to rightsholders, the combination of ambiguous doctrine and risk-
averse licensing will, over time, cause entitlements to grow and public privilege 
to shrink. 
In this Article, I describe how doctrinal feedback works in intellectual 
property’s three core disciplines and then address its normative implications.  
Part I looks at copyright law, where feedback’s autocatalytic effect is 
particularly pronounced.  It expands on the description given above, explores 
the sources of the risk aversion that produces so much unneeded licensing, and 
identifies those copyright uses and industries most likely to experience rights 
accretion. 
Part II covers trademark law, where doctrinal feedback produces a less 
pervasive and more attenuated expansion, for two reasons.  First, legal 
ambiguities and risk aversion are responsible for only some of trademark’s 
superfluous licensing markets; others are the result of mutually beneficial 
promotional arrangements, such as product placement in film and television, 
which do not consistently feed back into the licensing calculus.  Second, 
trademark law looks to consumer confusion, not licensing markets, when 
defining the reach of its entitlements, which means feedback occurs only when 
consumer perception reflects an acquired familiarity with licensing practices.  I 
 
2. See infra Part I.A. 
3. See infra Part I.B. 
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use research from the behavioral sciencesCnever before cited in the trademark 
literatureCto show that consumers acquire this familiarity much more readily 
than trademark law acknowledges. 
Part III discusses patent law, where doctrinal feedback, although present, is 
muted and produces no systemic expansion of entitlements.  The difference is 
partly doctrinal (patent law does not use licensing information to define the 
overall reach of its entitlements) and partly purposeful (courts in patent cases are 
more skeptical of the informational content of licensing markets).  Because 
patent law manages to make use of licensing information without suffering its 
distortive effects, however, it holds lessons for how we might address the more 
pernicious and expansive doctrinal feedback found in copyright and trademark. 
I apply those lessons in Part IV, where I cease being descriptive and instead 
consider the normative implications of doctrinal feedback.  The first normative 
question is whether doctrinal feedback is a problem.  For those who generally 
oppose the expansion of intellectual property law, the answer is clearly yesCbut 
I also show that those who favor an expansion should view doctrinal feedback 
as a poor means to that end.  The next question is how one might solve the 
feedback problem.  Reducing the risk aversion that fuels feedback is one 
obvious tactic, but that approach produces counterintuitive results laden with 
normative baggage, threatens to substitute a positivist expansion for an accretive 
one, and creates more problems than it cures.  In the end, I suggest a more 
normatively neutral solution, consisting of subtle refinements in how the 
positive law scrutinizes licensing information and consumer motivation.  This 
approach allows intellectual property to be market-referential without making it 
market-reverential. 
 
I. COPYRIGHT’S FEEDBACK LOOP 
Doctrinal feedback in copyright law arises from several uncontroversial 
premises.  First, core doctrinesCthe idea/expression dichotomy, the substantial 
similarity test, and the fair use defenseCcreate significant ambiguity regarding 
the reach of copyright rights.  Second, new creative works almost invariably 
borrow from old creative works, which raises the possibility of infringement on 
the part of the borrower.  Third, the penalties for copyright infringement are 
severe; monetary awards often vastly exceed what the defendant might have 
paid for a license, and injunctions are easy to come by.  Fourth, the players in 
key copyright industries tend to be risk averse, a tendency exacerbated by high 
up-front investments and the need to satisfy conservative insurers and 
downstream distributors. 
In combination, these factors cause copyright users to seeks licenses even 
when they have a good fair use claimCi.e, even when proceeding unlicensed 
would probably result in no liability.  This practice of unneeded licensing feeds 
back into doctrine through one final uncontroversial premise: the fair use 
defense looks to the existence vel non of a licensing market when defining the 
reach of the copyright entitlement.  The result is a steady, incremental, 
unintended expansion of copyright, caused by nothing more than ambiguous 
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doctrine and prudent behavior on the part of copyright users. 
 
A. Doctrinal Indeterminacy and the Risk-Averse Actor 
Picture a filmmaker, camera in hand, interviewing passers-by on the streets 
of Cleveland for a documentary about the migration of American manufacturing 
jobs overseas.  In one particularly poignant piece of footage, a homeless former 
factory worker spontaneously sings a lyric from a Bruce Springsteen song: 
They’re closing down the textile mill across the railroad tracks. 
Foreman says these jobs are going, boys, and they ain’t coming back.4
In post-production, as the filmmaker edits this clip into the documentary, she 
notices the singular features of Cleveland’s Rock and Roll Hall of Fame 
looming in the background of the shot.  The singing worker is also holding a 
copy of Newsweek, the cover of which is clearly visible.  The thought crosses 
her mind: does she need permission to include the building in her film?  The 
photograph on the magazine cover?  For that matter, what about the two lines 
from the Springsteen song? 
The prudent filmmaker would consult her lawyer, who would tell her that 
copyright law does indeed cover architectural, pictorial, and musical works, and 
that she may well have violated copyright’s exclusive rights by including the 
building, photograph, and song excerpt in her film.5 On the bright side, her 
lawyer would probably also mention copyright’s fair use defense and the 
protection it sometimes gives to defendants who make incidental and 
transformative use of copyrighted works. 
But what would her lawyer’s advice on fair use actually be? 
This is an important question for our documentarian, because the fair use 
doctrine is the last exit off the highway to infringement.  It is often the only 
thing standing between a litigant and liability.  Fortunately, for those litigants 
who need it, the doctrine is endlessly malleable.  It excuses a wide range of 
conduct, from parodying a pop song,6 to making personal copies of television 
programs for later viewing,7 to reverse-engineering a computer program for 
interoperability purposes.8 It can mutate into whatever form copyright’s 
objectives demand.9
Fair use’s adaptability, however, is a double-edged sword.  Determining 
whether fair use excuses a defendant’s conduct requires application of four 
 
4. Bruce Springsteen, My Hometown, BORN IN THE U.S.A. (1983). 
5. Whether the incidental inclusion of the building, cover, and song snippet is in fact a 
copyright violation is not entirely clear.  See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
COPYRIGHT, ' 13.05[D][3].  As we will soon see, however, this lack of clarity is key to the 
phenomenon of doctrinal feedback. 
6. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
7. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
8. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
9. Fair use “permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on 
occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.”  Stewart v. 
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (quoting Iowa State Univ. Research Found. v. Am. Broad. 
Cos., 621 F. 2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
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complicated, interdependent, and non-exclusive statutory factors10 and analysis 
of over 160 years of case law11Can intimidating and expensive undertaking.12
The case law has been particularly unhelpful.  The Supreme Court’s first 
incursions into fair use immediately struck a chord that still resonates in the 
jurisprudence: the doctrine’s equitable, fact-specific, and thus indeterminate 
nature.13 Those who were hoping for hard and fast rules were out of luck, and 
have remained so since.  From the ex post perspective of the defendant already 
embroiled in the expense of litigation, then, an adaptable, equitable defense is 
useful.  But for the prospective defendant wondering whether a given act will 
prove to be infringing, fair use is too ambiguous to provide much ex ante 
guidance.14 
This is not to say that our filmmaker has nothing on which to base a liability 
prediction.  The 160 years of fair use case law have produced a number of 
decisions that address the incidental use of copyrighted materials in movies.  
Some of these cases support the filmmaker’s fair use argument.15 Others do 
not.16 Presumably she and her lawyer could read the cases, extract those 
principles most relevant to her situation, and simply make a call. 
In reality, however, they would do no such thing, because the risk is too 
 
10. 17 U.S.C. ' 107. 
11. Although it did not actually use the term “fair use,” Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 
344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841), is commonly cited as the foundation of modern fair use analysis. 
12. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 187 (2004) (“[F]air use . . . simply means the right 
to hire a lawyer to defend your right to create.”); Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping 
Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 547, 566 (1997) (pointing out that “fair use 
. . . is hard to predict in advance and that it will be expensive to prove”); Jessica Litman, 
Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OREGON L. REV. 19, 45-46 (1996) (“[F]air 
use is a troublesome privilege because it requires a hideously expensive trial to prove that one’s 
actions come within its shelter.”). 
13. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985) (“[F]air 
use analysis must always be tailored to the individual case.”); Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 & n.31 (1984) (referring to fair use as an 
“equitable rule of reason” and citing with approval legislative history that asserts the 
impossibility of articulating a generally applicable definition).  The Court’s previous fair use 
cases had resulted in summary affirmance by an equally divided Court.  Williams & Wilkins Co. 
v. United States, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); Columbia Broadcast Sys. v. Loew’s, Inc., 356 U.S. 40 
(1958). 
14. The leading treatise underscores fair use’s ambiguity, noting that the three major 
Supreme Court decisions on fair use “were overturned at each level of review, two of them by 
split opinions at the Supreme Court level.”  4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, ' 13.05.  And it 
was the foundational fair use case, Folsom v. Marsh, that gave rise to Justice Story’s famous 
statement that “[p]atents and copyrights approach, nearer than any other class of cases belonging 
to forensic discussions, to what may be called the metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions 
are, or at least may be, very subtle and refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent.”  9 F. Cas. at 
344. 
15. E.g., Jackson v. Warner Bros., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 585  (E.D. Mich. 1997); Monster 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Amsinck v. 
Columbia Pictures Indus., 862 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Mura v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 
Inc., 245 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
16. E.g., Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2nd Cir. 1997); 
Brown v. McCormick, 23 F. Supp. 2d 594, 608 (D. Md. 1998). 
Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion 6 
 
great.  Not only is fair use famously ambiguous, but the price of making the 
wrong call is prohibitively high.  Injunctions issue as a matter of course in 
copyright casesCand not just upon proof of liability: a copyright owner that 
proves likelihood of success on the merits presumptively wins a preliminary 
injunction without any need to show irreparable injury.17 If our filmmaker 
proceeds without a license, she faces the prospect of a lawsuit that could bring 
her production to a screeching halt and force her to negotiate permissions from 
those who hold her livelihood hostage, even if her fair use claim would 
ultimately prove meritorious.  And if she loses the fair use argument, then she 
faces not only a permanent injunction, but a myriad of other sanctionsCstatutory 
damages, disgorgement of profits, attorney’s feesCthat may far exceed any 
license fee she would have had to pay.18 
In these circumstances, even a risk-neutral actor with a good fair use claim 
would choose to secure a license rather than take the small risk of incurring a 
severe penalty.  This is particularly so when the use of the copyrighted material, 
although incidental, is conspicuous.  Take our filmmaker example: Newsweek is 
one of the country’s most popular periodicals.  The Rock and Roll Hall of Fame 
is instantly recognizable to anyone who has seen it.  The Springsteen song was a 
top-ten hit.19 In all likelihood, then, unless her lack of liability is crystal-clear 
(and it rarely is, given the legal ambiguities), she will seek a license from all 
three potential plaintiffs before any of them so much as gets wind of her project. 
This “license, don’t litigate” tendency is compounded by two other factors.  
First, other key copyright doctrines share fair use’s indeterminacy.  For instance, 
copyright protects an author’s individualized expression, but his or her more 
abstract ideas are free for the taking.20 Yet distinguishing between idea and 
expression is difficult; as Learned Hand once despaired, “Nobody has ever been 
able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.”21 We find similar ambiguity in 
the “substantial similarity” standard by which courts evaluate how much 
copying is too much copying.22 Even if fair use were less imprecise, then, we 
would often be hard-pressed to determine exactly where private entitlement ends 
and public privilege begins. 
Second, and more important, the decisionmakers in the real world of 
copyright practice are typically risk averse.  New works of creativity often 
require high up-front investment, with the prospect of profit only after the work 
is completed.  With so much at risk, those who work with copyrighted materials 
 
17. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1174 (9th Cir. 
1989); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1254 (3d Cir. 1983); 
Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 620 (7th Cir. 1982); 
Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977). 
18. 17 U.S.C. '' 502 (injunctions), 504 (damages and profits), 505 (attorney’s fees). 
19. The song hit number six on the Billboard Hot 100 in 1986. 
20. 17 U.S.C. ' 102(b). 
21. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
22. “The determination of the extent of similarity that will constitute a substantial, and 
hence infringing, similarity presents one of the most difficult questions in copyright law, and one 
that is the least susceptible of helpful generalizations.”  4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, 
' 13.03[A] (footnote omitted). 
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try hard to avoid potential pitfalls, and understandably so.  They approach legal 
issues very conservatively, particularly issues like copyright liability, which 
have the potential to destroy or delay the entire project. 
Examples abound.  How-to books on copyright lawCeven those that do a 
good job explaining complex issues in plain EnglishCtell readers to invoke fair 
use sparingly.  “When in doubt, don’t,” they advise,23 heedless of the fact that 
doubt is copyright’s constant companion.  Publishers reduce the complexities of 
fair use to conservative bright-line rules that sacrifice accuracy for clarity: you 
may quote no more than X number of words, or lines, or paragraphs.24 (The 
results sometimes border on the absurd, as when The New York Times seeks a 
license to excerpt four lines of poetry in a column that makes fun of 
publishers.25) The recording industry develops a practice of demanding and 
paying for licenses even when they are not needed.26 Even institutions of higher 
learning, which one would think have an interest in a more free-flowing 
information culture, implement overly restrictive and reductive fair use 
policies.27 
These risk-averse tendencies are even more prominent among moneyed 
actors in mainstream industries like television and feature film, for two reasons. 
 
23. MICHAEL C. DONALDSON, CLEARANCE & COPYRIGHT 67 (2d ed. 2003); accord STEPHEN 
FISHMAN, THE COPYRIGHT HANDBOOK: HOW TO PROTECT & USE WRITTEN WORKS 11/4 (7th ed. 
2003); RICHARD STIM, GETTING PERMISSION: HOW TO LICENSE & CLEAR COPYRIGHTED 
MATERIALS ONLINE & OFF 9/5 (2000); Lloyd J. Jassin, Fair Use in a Nutshell: A Roadmap to 
Copyright’s Most Important Exception, http://copylaw.com/new_articles/fairuse.html (last 
visited May 8, 2006). 
24. “[A]lthough there is no legally established word limit for fair use, many publishers act 
as if there were one and require their authors to obtain permission to quote more then [sic] a
specified number of words (ranging from 100 to 1,000 words).”  FISHMAN, supra note 23, at 
11/8.  Despite his admonition, Fishman adds his own rule: “never quote more than a few 
successive paragraphs from a book or article, one or two lines from a poem, or take more than 
one graphic such as a chart, diagram or illustration.”  Id.; see also MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA 
BECKLES, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE? FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL 15-16 
(2005) (discussing specific numerical limits imposed by print publishers). 
25. See Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1025, 1077 (1998). 
26. Matthew Africa, Comment, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: 
New Technologies, New Markets, and the Courts, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1174-75 (2000). 
27. One example, from the University of California: 
It is important to understand that the law does not grant individuals the right to 
determine if they are making a fair use of a copyrighted work, rather, it provides 
guidelines for courts to make this decision on a case by case basis.  Fair Use analysis 
is not simple and the outcome of a Fair Use defense is not predictable. It is unwise to 
assume that you are not infringing a copyright unless the specific use has been 
determined by case law to be non-infringing based on Fair Use, such as video taping 
television broadcasts for home use or copying a portion of a work to provided 
comment or criticism. 
University of California, Office of the President, Office of Technology Transfer, Using 
Copyrighted Works of Others, http://www.ucop.edu/ott/crothers.html (2001); see also William 
W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1694 (1988) 
(“[A]s almost any college teacher can attest, the information presently being given faculty by 
university counsel regarding how much copyrighted material they may reproduce for classroom 
use is distinctly unhelpful.”). 
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First, as the amount of money involved increases, so does the risk aversion.  
The more one has to loseCeither in the form of initial investment or expected 
returnCthe more willing one is to incur marginal prophylactic expenses.  
Second, mainstream works intended for mass consumption have traditionally 
used a multi-tiered distribution model, in which a number of discrete parties 
need to be convinced that legal claims are unlikely.  Even if our documentary 
filmmaker is willing to roll the dice on a fair use claim, she may need the 
backing of a major studio in order to get the movie made, and will almost 
certainly need a commercial distributor to get it into first-run theaters, pay-per-
view channels, the DVD market, and broadcast and cable television.  Each of 
these stops along the distribution chain invites a new party to the table, and that 
party needs to be satisfied that the product it is peddling is not a time bomb of 
copyright liability.  If the filmmaker is not inclined to be risk averse, then, one 
of these downstream players will be, and the end result will be the same.28 Thus 
one film that reportedly cost $218 to make required an additional $230,000 
investment in licensing fees before a distributor was willing to take it on.29 
In the movie industry, errors and omissions (“E&O”) insurance usually 
fulfills this need for a risk-averse approach.30 For a relatively small premium 
(less than $10,000 for an independent film with no obvious legal problems), a 
filmmaker can obtain a policy that provides the protection necessary to placate 
the players at all levels.31 The premium, however, represents only part of the 
price.  The typical E&O insurance application not only presumes that the 
applicant has already paid an attorney to obtain clearances, but also requires the 
preparation of a copyright report setting forth a detailed history of the work and 
any related works.32 Written releases are necessary for all names, faces, and 
likenessesCeven in fictional storiesCand for any distinctive locations.33 “Film 
clips are dangerous,” says the application, and their use requires licenses not just 
from the filmmaker, but from “all persons rendering services or supplying 
material contained in the film clip.”34 Special attention must be paid to music, 
because of the hard-line position that music publishers take with regard to the 
 
28. KEITH AOKI, JAMES BOYLE & JENNIFER JENKINS, BOUND BY LAW 53-54 (2006) 
(discussing effect on licensing when broadcasters and others mass distributors enter the picture); 
PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS 5 (2005) (“Programmers, insurers 
and distributors are primarily concerned about legal risk to lawsuit, however frivolous . . . .”); 
HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 24, at 55 (noting that “gatekeeper-intermediariesCpublishers, 
broadcasters, distributors, and many ISPsC . . . care less about legal niceties or the rights of users 
than about avoiding expensive lawsuits.”). 
29. Nancy Ramsey, The Hidden Cost of Documentaries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, ' 2, at 
13 (discussing the film Tarnation). 
30. AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 28, at 9 (calling E&O insurance the “chokepoint” of 
rights). 
31. DONALDSON, supra note 23, at 199. 
32. Id. at 47, 203, 211, 214. 
33. Id. at 214.  Obviously some of these requirements speak to claims under something 
other than copyright law, such as trademark and right of publicity. 
34. Id. at 215. 
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need for new licenses for each reuse.35 Any failed attempt to secure a release 
must be reported on the application.36 And woe betide him who fails to fulfill 
the insurer’s demands that everything be licensed; filing a claim on an E&O 
policy can be the death knell for any future project.37 
My purpose here is not to indict insurers.  They are simply facilitating the 
risk aversion of the other players in the industry.  And those who wish to avoid 
this licensing morass can choose not to include in their films anything drawn 
from existing material, or can assume the risk themselves by using non-
traditional distribution methods like the Internet or other self-publishing.38 
But the E&O insurance application casts one important point in stark relief: 
being held liable is a secondary concern.  It’s being sued at all that poses the 
greater threat.  The applicant must report any intellectual-property-related claims 
brought against him or her in the last five years, whether successful or not, plus 
any prospect of claims relating to the current project and any facts under which 
a claim “might reasonably be asserted or legal proceeding instituted.”39 Any 
matter “potentially actionable” must be removed from the script.40 And the 
application closes with a general admonition to focus not on the merits of a 
potential claim, but on “the likelihood of any claim or litigation.”41 Again, 
better safe than sued. 
From the perspective of the risk-averse actor, this makes sense.  The ready 
availability of a preliminary injunction that can stop a production in midstream 
is enough to strike fear in the heart of any investor, not to mention the 
distraction and expense of defending against a lawsuit.  Transactional attorneys 
are accordingly paid not to avoid liability, but to avoid litigation.  And when 
they combine their clients’ understandable risk aversion with the ambiguity of 
the applicable legal doctrines, they are to be praised, not blamed, for advising 
the negotiation of licenses.42 As one how-to book sagely states, “An unfinished 
project, no matter how brilliantly conceived, is preferable to a lawsuit for 
copyright infringement any day.”43 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 211. 
37. “If you ever have a claim on E&O insurance, you might as well go into another line of 
work.  You can never file a claim or you get blacklistedCand never be insured again.”  
AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 28, at 23 (quoting historical filmmaker Robert Stone). 
38. “At one extreme is the film world, where a clearance culture and the need for E&O 
insurance have nearly obliterated fair use.  At the other end of the spectrum are the students, Web 
activists, and artists who freely appropriate copyrighted or trademarked material for creative 
purposes.”  HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 24, at 54. 
39. DONALDSON, supra note 23, at 212. 
40. Id. at 214. 
41. Id. at 215. 
42. Fisher, supra note 27, at 1693 (“The most telling indication of the seriousness of [the 
indeterminacy of fair use] is the character of the advice currently being given the members of 
those groups by their lawyers.”). 
43. LEE WILSON, FAIR USE, FREE USE, AND USE BY PERMISSION 153 (2005).  Wilson also 
provides a related example of wise (if dismaying) advice: 
Never decide to use a copyrighted work after you have been denied permission to do 
so.  Your transgression will be no greater than it would have been had you never 
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Small wonder, then, that two recent studiesCone that focused on 
documentary filmmakers, the other on the larger creative communityCfound 
that overly conservative licensing practices predominate even in the face of 
good fair use claims, resulting in a licensing culture that significantly and 
negatively impacts the creation of valuable new works.44 In the end, copyright’s 
substantive law matters very little, except in its ambiguity.45
B. Market Circularity 
We now see that risk-averse actors in important copyright industries tend to 
seek copyright licenses when they don’t need to.  That’s the first piece of the 
doctrinal feedback puzzle.  The second piece is equally uncontroversial, viz.:
fair use doctrine places substantial weight on existing licensing practices.  In 
other words, when a court is determining whether a given use of copyrighted 
material is fair, one important factor is whether there already exists a licensing 
market for the use in question.  If such a market does not exist, then the fair use 
claim gains ground.  If the market does exist, then the fair use claim loses 
ground.  I call this puzzle piece uncontroversial because the link between 
licensing practice and fair use doctrine is widely accepted not only by the courts, 
but also by a varied collection of scholars who hold otherwise divergent views 
on fair use. 
First, the courts.  The statutory definition of fair use sets forth four factors 
for judges to consider in deciding whether a given use is fair.46 Although they 
remain free to consider other factors as well, the four that the statute explicitly 
lists tend to dominate the jurisprudence.47 And the Supreme Court, the lower 
courts, and commentators have all recognized that of the four, it is the last 
factorC“the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work”Cthat is the most important.48 
Within this “market effect” factor, however, lies the danger of circularity, in 
 
requested such permission, but your action in defiance of the denial of permission to 
use the work is likely to anger the owner of the copyright.  Anger is an important 
ingredient in lawsuits. 
Id. at 152.  Such is the power that risk aversion puts in the hands of copyright owners.  Creators 
of new works are advised to seek permission when in doubt as the legality of their activity (and 
such doubt almost always exists), and when that permission is refused they are advised not to 
take the chance that it was not needed in the first place. 
44. AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 28; HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 24. 
45. “The rules that publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors impose 
upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon journalistsCthere are the real laws 
governing creativity.”  LESSIG, supra note 12, at 187. 
46. 17 U.S.C. ' 107. 
47. See, e.g., Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 
1175 n.10 (5th Cir. 1980). 
48. E.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985); 
Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1385 (6th Cir. 1996); 
Triangle Publ’ns, 626 F.2d at 1175; see also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, ' 13.05[A][4] 
(“If one looks to the fair use cases, if not always to their stated rationale, this emerges as the most 
important, and indeed, central fair use factor.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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which market effect plays the part of both premise and conclusion.  Whether a 
given use affects a work’s market depends on whether the copyright owner has 
the legal authority to exact payment for that use.  And it is that legal authority 
that is the ultimate question to be answered in fair use analysis.  In other words, 
we cannot know the market effect until we first decide whether there is a market 
to be affectedCyet market effect is supposed to help us make that decision. 
Some courts recognize the tautologic potential here.49 Their usual response 
is to try to break the vicious circle by disregarding purely theoretical revenue 
streams, focusing instead on “those that creators of original works would in 
general develop or license others to develop”50 or that are “traditional, 
reasonable, or likely to be developed.”51 When the defendant’s use has only 
recently become possible (e.g., because it uses a new technology), these 
standards may do little to clear the muddy waters of circularity; who can say 
whether an unforeseen use is  “reasonable” or is “likely to be developed” by the 
copyright owner?  But when the use is one that has been around long enough for 
a licensing market to develop, the presence or absence of such a market goes a 
long way toward deciding the case.52 In effect, then, fair use jurisprudence in 
established industries depends a great deal on customary practice. 
The fair use scholarship ends up in much the same place, albeit sometimes 
by a different route.  Scholarly references to customary licensing practices as a 
fair use factor go back some ninety years (making them even older than court 
references),53 but licensing markets are perhaps most significant to those 
modern-day scholars who view fair use as an agent of economic efficiency.  
Their argument is straightforward: fair use exists to ensure that welfare-
enhancing uses of copyrighted material will take place even when transaction 
costs impede consensual market transfers of copyright permissions.54 It follows 
that when established practice shows that consensual transfer is possibleCi.e., 
when the particular use is in fact consistently licensedCthe fair use defense is 
 
49. E.g., Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1387; Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 
60 F.3d 913, 929 (2d Cir. 1994).  Other courts don’t recognize the danger of circularity.  E.g.,
Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 781 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(“Whenever a user puts copyrighted software to uses beyond the uses it bargained for, it affects 
the legitimate market for the product.”). 
50. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994). 
51. Am. Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 930. 
52. E.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 567-69 (1985); 
Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1387; Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P. F. Collier & Son Co., 26 
U.S.P.Q. 40, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). 
53. E.g., ARTHUR W. WEIL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 429 (1917); RICHARD C. DE WOLF,
AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 143 (1925); Elizabeth Filcher Miller, Note, CopyrightsC“Fair 
Use,” 15 S. CAL. L. REV. 249, 250 (1942); Saul Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43, 51-52 (1955).  The oldest judicial use of licensing 
practicesCor, more accurately, the lack thereofCin a fair use case is in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.,
26 U.S.P.Q. at 42. 
54. The foundational article is Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural 
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 
(1982). 
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unavailable.55 
Curiously, scholars who reject this economic approach nevertheless come to 
the same conclusion.56 For example, Lloyd Weinreb argues that customary 
practice should heavily influence fair use determinations, not because it is a 
proxy for economic efficiency, but because fair use embodies notions of 
fundamental fairness that transcend narrow consideration of copyright’s 
utilitarian underpinnings.57 Gideon Parchomovsky views fair use through a 
Kantian lens of individual rights and autonomy, yet he too concludes that “only 
users whose takings comport with customary practices that govern creative 
activities in the relevant community should be able to avail themselves of the 
fair use doctrine.”58 And Michael Madison’s “pattern-oriented” approach to fair 
use asks “whether an individual’s use of a work without the consent of the 
copyright owner is consistent with a provable social or cultural pattern of 
conduct.”59
Scholars of all stripes thus agree with the courts: the existence vel non of 
traditional licensing markets should play an important role in determining 
whether fair use protects an unauthorized use of copyrighted material.  As we 
will now see, however, when we combine this perfectly reasonable 
consideration with the perfectly reasonable, risk-averse, “license, don’t litigate” 
attitude that prevails in important copyright industries, something strange 
happens.  I call it “doctrinal feedback,” and it is the source of inadvertent 
expansion in the reach of copyright entitlements. 
 
C. Copyright’s Doctrinal Feedback 
1. How It Works 
 
Doctrinal feedback works like this.  In Year One, X wants to incorporate 
part of Y’s copyrighted work into X’s project.  Assume X’s use is transformative 
and involves a quantitatively and qualitatively small portion of published 
material.  In other words, under the first three statutory factors, it’s a decent fair 
use candidate.60 As for the fourth factor, there is no established licensing 
 
55. Id. at 1613, 1615; Fisher, supra note 27, at 1727-29. 
56. Wendy Gordon is now arguably one such scholar, her views on fair use having evolved 
since her 1982 article.  She now sees the market as an imperfect measure of the values that the 
doctrine represents.  See Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: 
Commodification and Market Perspectives, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 149 
(Niva Elkin-Koren and Neil Weinstock Netanel eds. 2002).  Yet despite her apostasy, she still 
concludesCif for somewhat different reasonsCthat established licensing practice should be a 
major factor in fair use analysis.  See Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright Unto Caesar, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 75, 90 (2004). 
57. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 1137, 1159-61 (1990). 
58. Gideon Parchomovsky, Fair Use, Efficiency, and Corrective Justice, 3 LEGAL THEORY 
347, 349 (1997). 
59. Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1525, 1530 (2004). 
60. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552-53, 564-65 
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market for X’s use.  So X figures that he has a good shotClet’s say 80%Cat a 
fair use defense.  But that still leaves a 20% chance the use might be ruled 
infringing.  X, being risk averse and aware of the severe consequences of an 
adverse ruling, decides not to take that chance and so seeks and pays for a 
license from Y instead. 
Over time, other similarly situated parties follow suit.  By Year Three, then, 
there has emerged a widespread, active licensing market for the kind of use in 
which X engaged.  This means that in Year Four, the chances of winning a fair 
use argument for X’s kind of use have dropped considerably, because the 
existence of the licensing market militates against a fair use finding.  Now the 
use that was 80/20 in favor of fair use is more like 20/80 against.  The risk-
averse preference for licensing has circled back around into the doctrinal 
analysis and the reach of Y’s copyright has expanded.  This expanded reach also 
means that related uses of Y’s work that once would have been considered even 
more safe than X’s will start to become more risky, because the newly expanded 
licensing market affects the analysis in related markets as well. 
On the one hand, then, we have legal standards that quite reasonably look to 
the existence of a licensing market when defining the breadth of fair use.  On 
the other, we have an equally reasonable and possibly laudable tendency to 
obtain licenses where none may be needed.  Over time, fair use naturally shrinks 
and the scope of copyright expands.  Rather than disappearing, copyright’s gray 
areas move farther into conduct that used to be reserved for public use.  This 
movement creates more licensing markets, which in turn push the gray area even 
farther afield, and so forth. 
What about those who resist the pressure to licenseCthe risk-takers who use 
copyrighted material without authorization?  Unfortunately, such mavericks do 
little to stave off doctrinal feedback.  For one thing, they are likely to be few and 
far between, for reasons already explained, and will thus play no significant part 
in determining the licensing culture.  And even if they exist in greater-than-
expected numbers, their influence on licensing norms will be disproportionately 
small, for two reasons.  First, risk takers may rely on fair use, but that doesn’t 
mean they want to have to prove their case in court.  They will accordingly try to 
keep their unlicensed conduct quiet.61 In contrast, copyright owners have every 
reason to flaunt each license they secure.  Second, because risk aversion 
increases as projects get more expensive and mainstream, most risk takers will 
come from smaller-scale projects that do not involve widespread distribution 
through traditional channels.  Unauthorized uses will therefore receive 
disproportionately little attention when courts and practitioners evaluate 
 
(1985) (holding that published works are better fair use candidates than unpublished works and 
examining both quantitative and qualitative volume of copying); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994) (holding that fair use favors transformative uses). 
61. The exception that proves the rule is the defendant in Princeton University Press v. 
Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1384 (6th Cir. 1996), who was “something of 
a crusader against the system under which his competitors ha[d] been paying agreed 
royalties”Cand who paid the price when the court rejected his fair use claim. 
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licensing practices.62 
Foreign law constitutes one final distortive influence here.  To the extent 
that a film, book, song, etc. is intended for international distribution, the author 
must worry about foreign intellectual property regimes, which can be more 
restrictive than domestic law when it comes to unlicensed use of existing 
works.63 The prevailing licensing practice in the U.S. might therefore reflect 
these foreign restrictions, and courts and practitioners unwittingly invite those 
restrictions into U.S. law by relying on that licensing market in domestic fair use 
analysis. 
 
2. Positive Law and Strategic Behavior 
 
One of the interesting things about the doctrinal feedback phenomenon is 
that it works an expansion of the copyright entitlement in an inadvertent, 
accretive manner.  The whole idea is that risk-averse behavior prevents fair use 
claims from being litigated, so a licensing culture emerges based on very few 
and very infrequent guidelines from the positive law.  Instead of looking to 
courts and statutes for guidance, practitioners look to the internal practices of 
the relevant industries, and then apply the same market-referential standards that 
they would expect courts to apply if they were ever to litigate. 
This means that those typically blamed for copyright’s growthCcourts and 
legislaturesCplay at best a secondary role in this insidious means of expansion.  
Doctrinal feedback has little to do with case law and statutes, except insofar as 
reported decisions entrench the statutory ambiguities that give rise to the risk 
aversion in the first place.  It is an independent phenomenon that works its 
expansion regardless of whether courts and legislatures favor that outcome and 
regardless of whether copyright owners engage in rent-seeking behavior.  Even 
if copyright owners were guileless or had no interest in gaming the system, and 
even if statutes and case law were not overly favorable to rightsholders, the 
combination of ambiguous doctrine and risk-averse tendencies would result in 
an accretion of rights. 
That said, strategic behavior on the part of copyright owners can certainly 
exacerbate the accretive effect of doctrinal feedback.  Indeed, the only two 
commentators who have previously noticed this aspect of copyright circularity 
have ascribed the phenomenon not to structural causes, as I do, but to 
purposeful conduct on the part of entitlement holders.64 Such strategic behavior 
 
62. Many who rely on fair use “are afraid to admit to doing so publicly, for fear of drawing 
attention and legal action, whether frivolous or  notCthus robbing the recourse of fair use from 
public precedent.”  AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 28, at 29-30. 
63. For example, France allows no unauthorized use of unpublished works and provides 
no catch-all fair use defense even for unpublished works.  J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD COPYRIGHT 
LAW 345, 447 (2d ed. 2003). 
64. Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of 
Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 41 (1997) (ascribing growth of licensing 
market to self-serving strategic agreements among repeat players); Africa, supra note 26, at 1166 
(“Strategic behavior by users has not only prevented the creation of fair standards, it has 
entrenched unfair ones.”). 
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is not a necessary condition for doctrinal feedback, but if we relax the 
assumption that everyone involved is ingenuous, we see that the feedback effect 
is in fact highly manipulable.  For example, the ubiquitous cease-and-desist 
letter might represent rightsholders’ attempt to change the risk calculus in their 
favor, because such a letter (whether threatening or conciliatory) tells the 
recipient that the rightsholder knows of the use.65 Even when the argument for 
liability is weak, the letter’s recipient knows that he or she can no longer hope to 
proceed unnoticed. 
Another way in which copyright owners might game the system is by 
engaging in a sort of mutual backscratching: I’ll license your works if you 
license mine.  Both Lydia Pallas Loren and Matthew Africa have observed that 
a large publishing or media company is as likely to be licensor as licensee, 
because of its extensive collections of copyrighted works.  Such repeat players 
may therefore not fear a licensing culture, under the theory that the payments 
they make and the payments they receive will net out.66 
Yet if this sort of strategic backscratching is indeed a zero-sum game, one 
might wonder why repeat players would purposely choose to encourage 
licensing and its associated transaction costs rather than the alternative culture 
of comparatively costless fair use.  Indeed, Gideon Parchomovsky has suggested 
that as a normative matter copyright should allow permissionless intra-industry 
appropriationCi.e., members of a common authorial community should be able 
to claim fair use of each other’s material because they share a reciprocal risk of 
being infringed, which makes the intrusion on their property right in copyright 
morally acceptable.67 As a descriptive matter, however, the publishing industry 
apparently does just the opposite, as does the recording industry.68 
Moreover, it is not clear that strategic behavior predominates, or even that 
copyright owners understand the rent-seeking opportunities that doctrinal 
feedback presents.  The copyright literature is full of examples of rightsholders 
who demand exorbitant fees for incidental uses from parties who cannot afford 
them.69 If true, such examples suggest that copyright owners are not gaming the 
system, or at least not in a way that consistently serves their self-interest, 
because it is almost always in a rightsholder’s interest to agree to license an 
arguably fair use, so as to create a market that can later be used to argue that the 
 
65. See HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 24, at 29-37; Africa, at 1172. 
66. Loren, supra note 64, at 41; Africa, supra note 26, at 1172.  This argument has 
surfaced in patent disputes as well.  E.g., EWP Corp. v. Reliance Universal Inc., 755 F.2d 898, 
907-08 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
67. Parchomovsky, supra note 58, at 370-71. 
68. Loren, supra note 64, at 41; Africa, supra note 26, at 1174.  Perhaps the explanation is 
that non-economic considerations, such as a sense of moral desert, play a role in the formation of 
licensing practices.  More likely, however, is that licensing markets that form within a given 
group are not entirely internal, but instead can be used to rebut a fair use argument made by 
someone external to the industry.  See Loren, supra note 64, at 41-43. 
69. E.g., AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 28, at 12-19; HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 24, 
at 19; LESSIG, supra note 12, at 95-97; see also AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 28, at 12-13 
(describing “most favored nation” clauses that require licensees to pay all rightsholders the 
highest fee that it negotiates with any of them). 
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use is not in fact fair.70 The only reason to refuse to license in such 
circumstances is to engage in brand management (i.e., the use imposes 
unacceptable congestion costs or tarnishes the work)71 or to send an inflationary 
price signal (i.e., prospective licensees need to know that the rightsholder cannot 
always be bargained down).  Even then, granting a license remains an attractive 
option unless the licensing market is already so well established that the 
likelihood of a successful fair use claim has become negligible. 
On the opposite side of the transaction, copyright users may or may not be 
aware of doctrinal feedback and its consequences, but here too the feedback will 
occur regardless of the participants’ awareness.  Yet unlike copyright owners, 
copyright users will find it hard to manipulate doctrinal feedback to their 
advantage once they become aware of it, because they face a collective action 
problem: if one of them resists licensing but the rest do not, the resistor is facing 
a tougher fair use argument.72 Even if users realize that they are digging their 
own grave every time they agree to a license, then, resistance only helps if a 
critical mass of users resist.  This is a classic prisoner’s dilemma, and 
overcoming the dilemma’s usual barriers to trust and coordination is difficult, 
particularly when the insurers come calling.  Besides, copyright users may not 
be getting fully disinterested advice.  Once we relax our assumption of 
ingenuousness, we must realize that the lawyers who counsel clients on the need 
to license have a strategic interest too: advising clients to seek a license creates 
more earning opportunities for transactional attorneys than does advising them 
to roll the dice on a fair use claim. 
 
3. Affected Markets 
 
Where might we expect doctrinal feedback to be the most pronounced?  The 
answer to this question depends on a number of factors.  In descending order of 
importance, they are: the parties involved, the content being used, the mens rea 
of the user, and the uniformity of the legal precedent. 
As already discussed, where moneyed actors predominate, where multiple 
parties must sign off on the use, and where up-front costs are highest, increased 
risk aversion and a strong feedback effect are most likely.  Thus reliance of fair 
use will probably be the least frequent and the least well received in the feature 
 
70. See Loren, supra note 64, at 42-43. 
71. See Laura Bradford, Parody and Perception: Using Cognitive Research To Expand 
Fair Use in Copyright, 46 B.C. L. REV. 705 (2005) (describing approach to fair use based on 
preserving value of work); see also James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 167, 216-20 (2005) (discussing copyright as vehicle for censorship rather than 
exploitation of work). 
72. See Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 
(6th Cir. 1996) (finding no fair use on part of one copy shop that resisted licensing arrangements 
to which its competitors had agreed).  One resistance tactic less vulnerable to the prisoner’s 
dilemma problem would be for users to insist on “escape clauses” in their licensing agreements, 
under which they explicitly deny the legal necessity for the license even as they agree to it.  This 
approach has enjoyed some success in the patent context.  Burgess Cellulose Co. v. Wood Flong 
Corp., 431 F.2d 505, 510 (2d Cir. 1970). 
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film industry, with its high initial investments, availability of funds for licenses, 
and tiered distribution system.  Indeed, one recent study concluded that “a 
clearance culture and the need for E&O insurance have nearly obliterated fair 
use” in the film world.73 We find some of the same characteristics in the 
traditional music, broadcasting, advertising, and publishing industries.  Together 
these represent almost all of copyright’s most significant markets.74 In contrast, 
starving artists who rely on online distribution and other affordable, neoteric 
channels of trade are least likely to suffer a feedback effect,75 and private fair 
uses like the time-shifting in the well-known Betamax case will likewise be 
relatively unaffected.76
The nature of the content taken from the copyright owner also affects the 
risk calculus: the more detectable the appropriation, the more likely the license.  
Literal copyingCe.g., taking footage from a movieCwill be the most apparent to 
the investors, insurers, and potential plaintiffs from whom pressure to license 
emanates.  It is easy for the money man to notice that the film he is underwriting 
uses a clip from The Godfather, and thus to demand that the use be licensed.  It 
is not as easy for him to notice that the film borrows a plot device from The 
Godfather.77 Thus uses involving “fragmented literal similarity,”78 where the 
second work incorporates discrete snippets of expression directly copied from 
the first work (a few seconds of film footage, a few bars of a song, a few lines of 
a poem), are most likely to lead to doctrinal feedback.  This has particular 
significance in our modern “remix culture,” in which recombination of old 
expression is an increasingly essential step in the creation of new works.79 
To a lesser extent, the awareness of the borrower that something has been 
borrowed will affect whether a licensing culture develops.  The user of 
copyrighted material will only consider seeking a license when he or she realizes 
that such a use has taken place; when the use is accidental and incidental rather 
than purposeful, the prospect of seeking a license might never even occur to the 
user.  Ignorance, however, is not bliss: this scenario is unlikely to play much of 
a role in retarding the accretive expansion of the copyright entitlement because 
it is unlikely that many users will be ignorant or will maintain their ignorance as 
their work moves from creation to distribution.80 Those who earn a living from 
 
73. HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 24, at 54. 
74. The lone exception is probably software.  See STEPHEN E. SIWEK, COPYRIGHT 
INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 18 (2004) (describing copyright’s core industries). 
75. HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 24, at 54. 
76. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447-55 (1984) 
(holding that recording television programs for later viewing on Betamax was fair use). 
77. Furthermore, more abstract and obscure takings may not need to rely on fair use; the 
idea/expression dichotomy and de minimis defense will provide some cover.  If so, feedback is 
even less likely, because (unlike fair use) the application of the idea/expression dichotomy and 
the de minimis defense does not depend on the existence of a licensing market. 
78. This term is from the Nimmer treatise.  See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, 
' 13.03[A][2]. 
79. See Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
575, 578-79 (2005) (discussing prevalence and importance of “remix culture”). 
80. I am speaking descriptively here.  As a normative matter, incidental and accidental uses 
might be better fair use candidates than purposeful uses (all else being equal), because when the 
Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion 18 
 
working with copyrighted materials tend to be sensitive to the licensing issue.81 
Moreover, in those industries where several different players must sign off on a 
given work, someone in the distribution chain is bound to notice the 
incorporation of copyrighted material, particularly when it is of the “fragmented 
literal similarity” kind.  And both ignorance and bliss will disappear entirely if, 
upon the work’s release, the copyright owner notices the use and sends the user 
a cease-and-desist letter or files suit.  At that point, the user must confront the 
same “license or litigate” question that he or she had theretofore unwittingly 
managed to avoid. 
Finally, even the risk-averse will presumably not seek a license in the face 
of clear legal precedent that obviates the need to do so.  Such uses will thus not 
be vulnerable to the feedback effect.  Unfortunately, there are few areas in 
which the case law provides clear precedent.  Even in the case most favorable to 
creators who reuse copyrighted material, the Supreme Court remanded for 
further consideration of licensing evidence,82 and the Court has been adamant in 
its view that each case is unique and fact-dependent.83 Nor has the Court ever 
clarified the other ambiguous doctrines in feedback’s causal chain (the 
idea/expression dichotomy and the substantial similarity test).84 Case law from 
the lower courts is, not surprisingly, both more developed and more diverse.  
For every case that finds an incidental background use fair, there is another that 
does not.85 When the defendant manages to prevail, the holding sometimes 
reflects not an informed approach to licensing evidence, but a failure to consider 
it at all.86 And when we bring foreign law into the pictureCa necessary 
 
defendant has purposely chosen to incorporate the plaintiff’s work, there’s a better argument that 
there was something about the work that the defendant values and should pay for.  Cf. Africa, 
supra note 26, at 1175 (viewing unknowing incidental use as “perhaps [the] most troubling” 
aspect of feedback effect). 
81. See generally AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 28 (demonstrating awareness of 
licensing issue among independent documentary filmmakers). 
82. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 , 593-94 (1994). 
83. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985) (“[F]air 
use analysis must always be tailored to the individual case.”); Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 & n.31 (1984) (referring to fair use as an 
“equitable rule of reason” and citing with approval legislative history that asserts the 
impossibility of articulating a generally applicable definition). 
84. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, ' 13.03[E][1][b] (“In recent decades, the 
Supreme Court has confronted numerous copyright issues; yet none of those cases posed the 
line-drawing issue of how far a defendant can go without committing prima facie 
infringement.”).  The only case in which the Court can be said to have focused on the distinction 
between idea and expression was Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), which because of its age 
and the nature of the materials involved (accounting books and charts) does little to clear up the 
larger idea/expression ambiguity, giving rise instead to the narrower merger doctrine. 
85. E.g., compare Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., v. P. F. Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. 40 
(S.D.N.Y. 1934) (conjecturing that “the instance of a person being photographed incidentally 
reading a current magazine in which the copyrighted cover of a magazine was reproduced as a 
matter of background” would be a fair use), with Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, 
Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2nd Cir. 1997) (finding no fair use where pictorial work was used for 
twenty-seven seconds in background of television show). 
86. E.g., Monster Commc’ns, Inc. v. Turner Broadcasting Sys., 935 F. Supp. 490 
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consideration for those many users who eye global distributionCeven a clear 
Supreme Court interpretation of U.S. law will do little good. 
In sum, copyright’s doctrinal feedback is most pronounced in big-money 
industries like film, music, and publishing that combine literal takings with high 
costs, deep pockets, and multi-tiered distribution.  It takes place regardless of 
whether copyright owners know about or try to manipulate it, regardless of 
whether copyright users know and want to do something about it, and regardless 
of whether the positive law of copyright also expands.  This is not to say that 
doctrinal feedback is not manipulable (it is) or that copyright owners do not 
manipulate it (they may), or that courts, legislatures, and rent-seeking 
rightsholders play no purposeful, positivist role in copyright’s expansion (they 
do).  But doctrinal feedback is its own animal, an independent contributor to the 
seemingly ever-expanding reach of the copyright entitlement.  It does not 
depend on developments in legislation or litigation, or on strategic behavior in 
the marketplace.  Rather, it emerges from seemingly innocent structural features 
of copyright law and from sensible, prudent behavior on the part of everyone 
involved.  Whether we care as a normative matter about this phenomenon is 
another question, which I will defer until after we examine the role of licensing 
information in trademark and patent law. 
 
II. TRADEMARK’S FEEDBACK LOOP 
Like copyright law, trademark law has seen a steady expansion over the last 
few decades, with new subject matters qualifying for its protection, more 
conduct falling within its entitlements, and additional remedies becoming 
available to its beneficiaries.  Courts and legislatures are responsible for many of 
these developments87 and have received the lion’s share of the attention in the 
scholarship.88 Yet trademark’s growth is not just the result of formal changes in 
the positive law.  Instead, trademark licensing practices inform trademark law, 
resulting in an expansive feedback loop rooted in the internal structure of 
trademark doctrine. 
Trademark’s doctrinal feedback occurs in three steps.  First, courts consider 
a mark infringed when its unlicensed use is likely to cause confusion among 
consumers as to whether the mark owner produced, sponsored, or approved of 
the goods.  The definitions of sponsorship and approval, however, are 
notoriously broad and ambiguous, making liability a significant possibility for 
 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Amsinck v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 862 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).  In 
one case, the defendant vindicated an incidental use almost by accident, having mistakenly 
thought that the use was licensed.  Gordon v. Nextel, 345 F.3d 922, 926 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(prevailing on de minimis grounds rather than fair use). 
87. E.g., Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, PUB. L. NO. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 
(1996) (expanding scope of entitlement); Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, PUB. L. NO.
100-667, ' 132, 102 Stat. 3935, 3946 (same); W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337 (7th 
Cir. 1985) (recognizing trademark protection for product design). 
88. E.g., Robert C. Denicola, Freedom To Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661, 1667-68 (1999); 
Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 
(1999); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999). 
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any use of a mark from which consumers might infer acquiescence by the mark 
owner.  In other words, if consumers think that a given use of a mark requires a 
license from the mark owner, then engaging in that use without a license 
presents a real risk of liability. 
Second, trademark users often seek licenses when none is needed.  
Sometimes they do so because they are risk averse and do not want to take their 
chances with trademark’s indeterminate doctrines and supracompensatory 
remedies, much as we have seen in copyright law.  Other times they seek 
licenses not as a mere prophylactic measure, but as part of a mutually beneficial 
promotional arrangement, like product placement in film and television.  In the 
end, however, the result is the same: licensing markets where none need exist. 
Finally, to complete the loop, these licensing markets feed back into the 
infringement analysis as consumers actively absorb the branding practices they 
encounter in the marketplace and thus learn over time which trademark uses are 
licensed.  As we will see, a compelling body of empirical studies from the 
behavioral sciencesCnever before cited in the trademark literatureCsuggests that 
as consumers encounter more and more licensed uses and fewer and fewer 
unlicensed uses, they will come to view licensing as the norm.  And what 
consumers view as the norm becomes the norm, because consumer perception is 
trademark law’s touchstone. 
The end result is that the gray areas of trademark law become less grayCor, 
more accurately, shift toward uses that had once unquestionably been within the 
public’s prerogative rather than the mark owner’s.  This feedback effect is less 
consistent and more attenuated than we saw in copyright, for reasons that will 
soon become apparent.  But it exists nonetheless, and like its copyright 
counterpart it causes an accretive expansion the reach of trademark entitlements 
with minimal contributions from courts, legislatures, and rent-seeking 
rightsholders. 
 
A. Trademark Doctrine 
The prototypical trademark infringement case involves confusion as to the 
source of the defendant’s goods.  Suppose an upstart soft drink company uses 
the “Pepsi” mark on its new cola.  By doing so, the upstart passes off its product 
as that of PepsiCo and confuses loyal Pepsi drinkers into buying its soda, rather 
than the PepsiCo product they have come to know and love.  Trademark law 
evolved to give mark owners like PepsiCo a way to stop the upstart and thus to 
prevent harm both to consumers (who are being deceived) and the mark owner 
(whose sales are being diverted). 
Confusion from passing off one producer’s product as that of another 
represents trademark’s core concern, but actionable confusion can arise even 
when consumers clearly understand that the product they are buying did not 
originate with the mark owner.  Modern trademark law forbids not only those 
uses of a mark that are likely to confuse consumers as to the origin of goods, but 
also any uses that are likely to cause confusion as to sponsorship or approval of 
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the goods.89 The case law on sponsorship and approval, however, is so 
ambiguous as to make it almost impossible to know ex ante whether a given use 
will be infringing.90
The ambiguity begins with imprecise vocabulary.  Courts use a variety of 
synonymous and not-so-synonymous terms to describe the kind of confusion at 
issue, from the federal Lanham Act’s sponsorship and approval terminology, to 
whether the relationship between the parties is one of endorsement,91 
affiliation,92 association,93 connection,94 authorization,95 permission,96 or 
license,97 to whether the use produced confusion “of any kind.”98 Attached to 
these descriptors comes a host of catch-all modifiers, selected precisely for their 
imprecision: Was there confusion as to whether the mark owner “otherwise” 
approved or was “in some other way” connected?99 Was there a relationship “of 
some sort” or a suggestion that the defendant’s product emanated “in some way” 
 
89. E.g., 15 U.S.C. ' 1125(a)(1) (prohibiting use of mark that “is likely to cause confusion, 
or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of . . . goods, 
services, or commercial activities”). 
90. There are other sources of trademark indeterminacy as well, such as the ubiquitous 
multi-factor test for likelihood of confusion, AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th 
Cir. 1979), and the uncertain reach of dilution liability, see Lauren P. Smith, Note, Trademarks 
and the Movies: “An Af-‘Fair Use’ To Remember,” 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 415 (2000). 
91. Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 544 (5th Cir. 1998); Boston 
Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1989); Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 
836 F.2d 397, 398 (8th Cir. 1987); Medic Alert Foundation U.S., Inc. v. Corel Corp., 43 F. 
Supp. 2d 933, 937 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
92. Pebble Beach, 155 F.3d at 543; Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 
769, 774 (8th Cir. 1994); Mut. of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 398; Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 
287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 918 (C.D. Ill. 2003); Medic Alert, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 937. 
93. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 332 (2d Cir. 1983); Caterpillar,
287 F. Supp. 2d at 918; Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 232, 240 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994); MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 873 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also Schieffelin & Co., 850 F. Supp. at 247 (“mental association”). 
94. Pebble Beach, 155 F.3d at 544; Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d at 774; Boston Athletic, 867 
F.2d at 34; Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d 
Cir. 1979); NFL v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1380 (D. Del. 1977).  Courts’ use of 
“affiliation,” “association,” and “connection” may derive from language in the Lanham Act 
regarding confusion “as to the affiliation, connection, or association” between the mark user and 
“another person.”  15 U.S.C. ' 1125(a)(1)(A). 
95. Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 854-55 (7th Cir. 
1982); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 77 (2d Cir. 1981). 
96. Pebble Beach, 155 F.3d at 544; University of Georgia Athletic Ass’n v. Laite, 756 
F.2d 1535, 1546 n.28 (11th Cir. 1985).  But see Pebble Beach, 155 F.3d at 544 n.10 (noting that 
“approval” might have been better term than “permission”). 
97. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 28-29; Dallas Cowboys, 604 F.2d at 205. 
98. Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971). 
99. Dallas Cowboys, 604 F.2d at 205; see also Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 28-29 
(“otherwise” endorsed); Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(“otherwise” affiliated); Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J.H. Ray Jewelry Co., 
676 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1982) (“other” association); Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. 
Supp. 2d 913, 918 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (“otherwise” affiliated); Medic Alert Foundation U.S., Inc. v. 
Corel Corp., 43 F. Supp. 2d 933, 937 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (“otherwise” affiliated). 
Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion 22 
 
from the mark owner?100 Will consumers “in some fashion” associate the 
plaintiff and defendant?101
The choice of terminology does not appear to be result-oriented; courts that 
favor the defendant use broad language just as readily as courts that favor the 
plaintiff.102 Rather, it seems designed to give courts the flexibility to reach an 
equitable result despite substantial variation in the fact patterns they encounter.  
Whether it accomplishes this goal is debatable, much like the question of 
whether the equitable nature of the fair use doctrine leads to the correct outcome 
in copyright disputes.  As we will see, however, it has the effect of creating 
substantial gray areas into which the risk-averse trademark user fears to tread. 
The ambiguity in terminology leads to further ambiguity regarding the 
proper focus of the confusion analysis.  Under the Lanham Act, the confusion 
must relate to whether the mark owner sponsored or approved the defendant’s 
product.103 But as courts employ a variety of decreasingly analogous synonyms 
for sponsorship and approval, the focus shifts from whether the plaintiff 
sponsored or approved of the defendant’s product to whether the plaintiff 
acquiesced in defendant’s use of plaintiff’s mark.104 And some courts seem to 
 
100. Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 232, 240, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994); see also id. at 247 (“some” mental association); Pebble Beach, 155 F.3d at 544 (“some” 
connection); Nike, Inc. v. Just Did It Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1228 (7th Cir. 1993) (“in some way” 
related) (quoting James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 
1976)); Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 34 (“some” connection); Caterpillar, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 918 
(“somehow” sponsored). 
101. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 873 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
102. E.g., compare Just Did It, 6 F.3d at 1228 (reversing judgment for plaintiff regarding 
confusion as to whether defendant’s product was “in some way related to, or connected or 
affiliated with, or sponsored by” plaintiff) (quoting James Burrough, 540 F.2d at 274), and 
Supreme Assembly, 676 F.2d at 1082 n.3, 1084 (affirming judgment for defendant regarding 
confusion as to “connection” and whether defendant’s product “was in any way endorsed, 
sponsored, approved or otherwise associated” with plaintiff), with Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. 
Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 1994) (reversing judgment for defendant and 
ordering judgment for plaintiff regarding confusion as to whether defendant’s product was 
“affiliated with, connected with, or sponsored by” plaintiff) (quoting 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION ' 24:03 (3d ed. 1992)), and Schieffelin,
850 F. Supp. at 247 (issuing preliminary injunction based on evidence of confusion as to 
“association” with and “authorization” by plaintiff and whether defendant’s product “emanated 
in some way” from and evoked “some mental association” with plaintiff). 
103. The exact language refers to “confusion . . . as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval 
of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities.”  15 U.S.C. ' 1125(a)(1).  Note that state 
statutes may use other, more expansive terms, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. ' 10-1-372 (focusing on 
confusion as to “affiliation, connection, or association with or certification by another”), and that 
owners of federally registered marks can also proceed under a section of the Lanham Act that 
contains no limits on the kinds of confusion it deems actionable but that focuses on mark uses 
directly related to advertising, see 15 U.S.C. ' 1114(1). 
104. E.g., Pebble Beach, 155 F.3d at 544 (“For a party to suggest to the public, through its 
use of another’s mark or a similar mark, that it has received permission to use the mark on its 
goods or services suggests approval, and even endorsement, of the party’s product or service and 
is a kind of confusion the Lanham Act prohibits.”); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. 
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979) (“The public’s belief that the mark’s 
owner sponsored or otherwise approved the use of the trademark satisfies the confusion 
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have jettisoned the confusion requirement altogether.105 
Finally, the indeterminacy culminates in the use of surveys to assess 
consumer reaction to a disputed use.  Courts have come to expect and rely on 
survey evidence as a matter of course, so much so that their absence is 
sometimes held against the mark owner.106 Yet when it comes to confusion as 
to sponsorship or approval, surveys rely on the same broad and ambiguous 
collection of terms that courts use to define the kind of confusion at issue, from 
whether the defendant’s product is “sponsored” or “authorized”107 to whether 
the mark owner simply “goes along” with the use of the mark.108 Perhaps the 
most popular survey asks the respondent to opine on whether “permission” was 
required for the challenged use,109 which effectively takes consumers’ 
impressions of the relevant licensing culture and converts them into law.  
Moreover, a mark owner can win its suit by showing a likelihood of confusion 
among a surprisingly small percentage of the consuming publicCas low as ten 
or fifteen percent.110 
requirement.”). 
105. E.g., Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 1989) (enjoining sale 
of t-shirts that suggested link with Boston Marathon without requiring mark owner “to prove that 
members of the public will actually conclude that defendants’ product was officially sponsored 
by the Marathon’s sponsor (whoever that sponsor may be)”); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, 
Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 33 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding infringement from fact that consumers identified 
defendant’s toy car with car from plaintiff’s television show “though there was no showing that 
consumers believed that the toy cars marketed by [defendant] were sponsored or authorized by 
[plaintiff]”). 
106. 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 102, ' 32:195. 
107. Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 854-55 (7th Cir. 
1982) (“sponsored or authorized”); Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 
232, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (Aauthorization”); NFL Props., Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 
532 F. Supp. 651, 661 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (“authorization or sponsorship”); NFL v. Governor of 
Del., 435 F. Supp. at 1380-81 (“authorization”). 
108. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400-01 (8th Cir. 1987). 
109. Permission surveys have been instrumental in dozens of cases, see Jacob Jacoby, Sense 
and Nonsense in Measuring Sponsorship Confusion 11-14 & nn.38-39 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Law 
& Econ. Working Paper No. 29, 2005), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu/lewp/papers/29, but 
are based on deeply flawed assumptions about the behavior of the actors in the market and 
grievously oversimplified interpretations of the law.  On the factual front, they assume that no 
business enterprise would seek a license unless the law required it, id. at 8-9, which we will see 
is demonstrably untrue.  On the legal front, they assume that intellectual property law is no 
different from the law that governs realty and personalty, and that the public thus correctly 
understands the proper scope of intellectual property rights, id. at 24-26Can argument so facile 
that it requires no rebuttal.  Cf. NFL Props., Inc. v. ProStyle, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1018-19 
(E.D. Wis. 1998) (ruling permission survey inadmissible because it would “accord trademark 
protection based upon the public’s mistaken notion of the law”); Major League Baseball Props., 
Inc. v. Sed Non Olet Denarius, Ltd., 817 F. Supp. 1103, 1122-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding 
permission survey questions “leading” and “fatally flawed”), vacated, 859 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994). 
110. E.g., Mut. of Omaha, 836 F.2d 397 (giving “substantial weight” to survey in which 
“approximately ten percent of all the persons surveyed thought that [plaintiff] ‘goes along’ with 
[defendant’s] product”); James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 278-79 
(7th Cir. 1976) (reversing directed verdict when survey showed 15% of consumers were 
confused as to plaintiff’s sponsorship); Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. 
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In the end, then, surveys do little more than record consumers’ intuitions as 
to what the law might require.  Courts’ reliance on such surveys to define the 
reach of the trademark entitlement thus amounts to a tautological endorsement 
of whatever consumers believe the law is, or should be, regardless of whether 
their beliefs make any sense from a policy standpoint.  Instead of telling the 
public what the law has to say about the legality of unlicensed trademark uses, 
courts instead ask the public. 
Thus we see that trademark doctrine opens itself up to the same circularity 
that we saw in copyright law.  The reach of the entitlement depends on 
consumer perception.  If that perception is formed at least in part by exposure to 
licensing practices, then the law conflates premise and conclusion and invites 
doctrinal feedback.111 To close this loop and show that it expands the 
entitlement, however, we need two more ingredients: licensing markets where 
none is needed, and a means of feeding that licensing information back into 
consumer perception.  I will consider each in turn. 
 
B. Licensing Motivations 
We have just seen that the boundaries of trademark rights, like their 
copyright counterparts, are indeterminate.  And like copyright law, trademark 
law not only provides supracompensatory monetary remedies112 but also 
strongly presumes that prevailing rightsholders deserve injunctions, both 
preliminary and permanent.113 It should therefore come as no surprise when 
trademark users who could mount a decent defense against an infringement 
claim nevertheless choose to seek a license.  This is particularly true for 
moneyed, risk-averse actors like movie and television producers; from their 
perspective, or that of their E&O insurer, it makes no difference whether the 
court order that brings the project to a screeching halt originates in trademark 
law or copyright law.  Filmmakers accordingly approach trademark licensing as 
conservatively as they approach copyright licensing,114 with “license, don’t 
litigate” drilled into their heads starting in film school.115 
Yet risk aversion and the fear of being sued provide only part of the 
 
Steinway and Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (finding “strong evidence” of 
likelihood of confusion where 7.7% of those surveyed “preceived [sic] a business connection” 
between the parties and “8.5% confused the names”). 
111. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 102, ' 24:9; Denicola, supra note 88, at 1667-68; Stacey 
L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 
EMORY L.J. 461, 485-86 (2005); Lemley, supra note 88, at 1708; Lunney, supra note 88, at 396-
97. 
112. E.g., 15 U.S.C. '' 1114(1)(a), 1117. 
113. E.g., Int’l Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1084 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (AAt the preliminary injunction stage, . . . a [trademark] plaintiff need only 
demonstrate that he or she has a ‘better than negligible’ chance of succeeding on the merits to 
justify injunctive relief.”); NFL Props., Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 
664 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (ordering permanent injunction in merchandising dispute as “the 
standard remedy in unfair competition cases”). 
114. HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 24, at 20-21. 
115. Id. at 18. 
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explanation for the existence of unneeded trademark licenses.  Mutually 
advantageous business opportunities also create licensing markets.  
Merchandising provides a good example.  Consider Triangle Publications, Inc. 
v. Rohrlich,116 one of the first cases to recognize the viability of a claim of 
sponsorship confusion.  Triangle Publications published Seventeen, the well-
known magazine for teenage girls.  Rohrlich sold girdles under the trademark 
“Miss Seventeen.”117 Triangle sued Rohrlich for trademark infringement.  
Although Triangle was in the business of selling magazines, not clothing, the 
Second Circuit placed great weight on the district court’s finding that the 
“Seventeen” mark 
had played an important part in the merchandising of teen-age apparel in 
various ways, such as by conferences with manufacturers, editorial fashion 
comments, sales to manufacturers and merchandisers of reprints, counter-
cards and blow ups of its comments and of advertising, monthly bulletins 
advising merchandisers how to tie in with forthcoming issues of the magazine, 
and by aiding merchandisers in arranging window displays and departmental 
displays.118
The court accordingly concluded that “the public was likely to attribute the use 
of ‘Seventeen’ in connection with sales of teen-age merchandise to the plaintiff 
as a source of sponsorship” and affirmed a judgment against Rohrlich.119 We 
can infer that the merchandising relationships that were so important to the 
case’s outcome came about not because the various manufacturers and 
merchandisers engaged in merely prophylactic licensing, but because they 
genuinely wanted to strike a symbiotic promotional deal with a popular 
periodical.120 
Similar promotional arrangements occur in the entertainment industry, 
where producers strike “product placement” deals with mark ownersCnot 
because they necessarily have to, as a legal matter, but because the deals 
represent money-making opportunities.  If our Cleveland documentarian is 
worried about whether the appearance of the “Newsweek” mark in her film will 
lead to sponsorship or approval liability, she can call Newsweek Inc. and offer 
to pay a fee for a trademark license.  But why not instead ask the mark owner to 
pay her a fee?  Manufacturers are increasingly arranging (and paying) for the 
conspicuous use of their products or appearance of their logos in popular media. 
 A seven-second close up of Sunlight brand detergent on the sitcom Everybody 
 
116. 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948). 
117. Id. at 970. 
118. Id. at 971. 
119. Id. The holding technically rested on a finding of unfair competition; the  court 
declined to reach the trademark issue.  Id. at 971. 
120. A similar phenomenon may cause a feedback-fueled expansion of rights of privacy and 
publicity at the expense of the public domain: authors and filmmakers who recount factual events 
may strike a deal with those whom they depict, not because they fear litigation, but because “the 
persons involved may have information that would otherwise be hard to find out and can serve a 
promotional role .”  DONALDSON, supra note 23, at 48 (noting that insurers may now insist on 
such clearances). 
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Loves Raymond cost over $20,000.121 On Friends, a lengthy product placement 
for Snuggle fabric softener cost ten times that muchCbut for that price one of 
the characters actually handled the package.122 In the late 1990s, product 
placement routinely generated an estimated fifteen percent of Hollywood’s 
feature film revenue, and more recent studies suggest the figure has risen to 
twenty-five percent.123 For one recent James Bond film, MGM enlisted over 
twenty marketing partners for a total of at least $100 million, $35 million of 
which came from Ford Motor Company alone.124 
In short, risk aversion and promotional opportunities combine to create 
markets for trademark licenses where none is needed.  As we will soon see, 
these two different motivations for licensing have different implications for how 
strong trademark’s feedback effect will be. 
 
C. Persuasion Knowledge 
We now have two of the three pieces of trademark’s feedback puzzle: an 
ambiguous infringement doctrine that depends on consumer perception, and 
unneeded licensing markets.  Now we must connect the dots: the licensing 
markets must cause consumer perception to change, so that perception feeds 
back into doctrine. 
This final step is the least intuitive, because trademark law tends to view 
consumer perception as static and consumers as gullible dupes, helpless to deal 
with even marginally confusing marketing practices.  For example, an 
unlicensed mark user can easily lose an infringement suit even when ninety 
percent or more of the public is not confused by the use.125 And the case law 
often views consumers as incapable of learning from past encounters with 
trademarks.  One line of cases holds that an Internet search engine cannot show 
Toyota advertising when its users search for “Honda,” under the rationale that 
consumers will blithely assume that advertisements accompanying search results 
will relate only to the brand for which the search was conducted.126 These 
holdings ignore the obvious: those who operate under that assumption will 
quickly (and relatively costlessly) be disabused of it the first time they click on 
such an ad and see only Toyota products, and will presumably adjust their 
expectations thereafter so as not to be confused again.127 
121. Louis Chunovic, Trying To Price Placement, ADVERTISING AGE, Dec. 2, 2002, at 4. 
122. Id. 
123. Kim Bartel Sheehan & Aibing Guo, “Leaving on a (Branded) Jet Place”: An 
Exploration of Audience Attitudes Towards Product Assimilation in Television Content, J. 
CURRENT ISS. & RES. IN ADVERTISING, Spring 2005, at 79, 80. 
124. Jane Weaver, A License to Shill, MSNBC NEWS (June 16, 2003), 
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3073513. 
125. See sources cited supra note 110. 
126. E.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 
2004); Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No. Civ. 04-4371JRTFLN, 2006 WL 737064 
(D. Minn. Mar 20, 2006). 
127. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on 
the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 823 (2004). 
Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion 27 
 
A compelling body of empirical studies from the behavioral sciencesCnever 
before cited in the intellectual property scholarshipCteaches us that such 
adjustments of consumer expectation are common.  Consumers routinely 
develop an awareness of the promotional nature of the marketing efforts that 
bombard them and an ability to appreciate and manage their own reactions 
thereto.128 This ability on the part of consumers, called “persuasion 
knowledge,” should come as no surprise.  The average consumer encounters 
some three thousand brand names a day.129 That’s three thousand opportunities 
for the consumer to learn about trademark practices. 
When it comes to learning about sponsorship or approval, for example, 
consumers cannot help but notice the proliferation of cross-promotional 
arrangements in the mass media, where obviously unconnected enterprises 
constantly associate with one another in a clearly “official” capacity.  The Eddie 
Bauer logo adorns the side of a Ford SUV.  Xerox sponsors the Olympic 
Games.  A single television commercial advertises both the NBA playoffs and 
the latest Hollywood blockbuster, incorporating and interspersing footage from 
both.  When consumers experience these promotional efforts, they draw certain 
conclusions about the interaction of mark owners and the law that governs 
sponsorship, and stand ready to apply that new persuasion knowledge to the 
next marketing tool they encounter.  Changes in licensing practices can 
therefore effect changes in consumer perception.  Any given analysis of how 
consumers perceive a trademark useCfor example, a consumer survey, or a 
court ruling that relies on such a surveyCrepresents a mere snapshot of a 
moving target, whose perception may be quite different after new licensing 
practices work their magic.130 
The strength of trademark’s feedback effect accordingly depends on how 
easy it is for consumers to acquire persuasion knowledge about trademark 
practice.  When consumers readily understand that a given use is licensed, the 
entitlement will more easily and organically expand to include that sort of use.  
When such an understanding is harder to come by, accretive expansion is 
slower, or altogether absent.  A review of trademark’s doctrinal feedback in the 
film and television industry and the merchandising industry will demonstrate 
this point. 
 
128. For the foundational research, see Marian Friestad & Peter Wright, The Persuasion 
Knowledge Model: How People Cope with Persuasion Attempts, 21 J. CONSUMER RES. 1 (1994). 
129. Michelle R. Nelson & Laurie Ellis McLeod, Adolescent Brand Consciousness and 
Product Placements: Awareness Liking and Perceived Effects on Self and Others, 29 INT’L J. 
CONSUMER STUD. 515, 516 (2005). 
130. “All people are ‘moving targets’ whose knowledge about persuasion keeps changing,” 
making it risky to “rely[] on subjects who are uniformly at any particular stage of persuasion 
knowledge development.”  Friestad & Wright, supra note 128, at 23. 
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1. Film and Television 
 
Suppose Aidan Auteur makes a film in which the hero chugs a can of Red 
Bull energy drink.  Would a consumer be confused as to whether the maker of 
Red Bull sponsored the film?  Maybe not.  We might even say probably not.131 
But as we have seen, the law is sufficiently ambiguous and Aidan sufficiently 
risk averse that he may decide not to take any chances with his investment.  He 
will either forgo the use of the brand-name product or get a license from the 
mark owner.  As it happens, each of these options affects the persuasion 
knowledge consumers will acquire about trademark practices in the film 
industry.  If he simply substitutes a glass of water or some fictional brand for the 
Red Bull, viewers might never notice and would thus acquire little persuasion 
knowledge about the trademark considerations that guided his decision.  
Likewise, if he secures a license to use the brand, but its use remains incidental 
and inconspicuous, then consumers will again draw few conclusions from its 
appearance.  These options therefore suggest a weak feedback effectCalthough 
even in these two cases some persuasion knowledge results: if other filmmakers 
follow suit, recognizable brands will only rarely be prominently featured in 
movies and will consequently be more noticeable to the public when they do. 
Aidan’s remaining two options affect consumer perception more directly 
and thus produce stronger feedback.  First, suppose he uses digital pixels to blur 
the image of the can so that the Red Bull brand is not recognizable (an 
increasingly common and accessible practice, particularly in “reality” television 
and documentaries).132 Such pixelation sends a strong signal to viewers that 
 
131. On this precise point, the case law favors unlicensed use.  In 2003, the owner of the 
well-known “Caterpillar” mark for earth-moving equipment lost a motion for a temporary 
restraining order against Disney’s release of George of the Jungle 2, in which Caterpillar 
bulldozers were shown poised to wreak environmental havoc on George’s beloved Ape 
Mountain.  Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 916-18 (C.D. Ill. 2003).  
Although the court that Caterpillar had a “slightly more than negligible likelihood of success” on 
its confusion claim, id. at 920, that was not enough to outweigh the harm to Disney that would 
result from issuance of the order, id. at 923.  That said, the court indicated that its holding might 
change as licensing practices change: “Part of what drives the Court’s discomfort with 
Caterpillar’s position is the fact that the [unlicensed] appearance of products bearing well known 
trademarks in cinema and television is a common phenomenon.”  Id. at 919.  And there is 
sufficient contrary precedent to render the issue ambiguous: one of the best-known and most 
expansive sponsorship cases held that trademark law forbade the unlicensed use of an NFL 
cheerleading uniform in the pornographic film Debbie Does Dallas, although that ruling also 
focused on the use of the uniform in the film’s promotion.  Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. 
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 1979) (affirming preliminary injunction).  
Experienced trademark counsel will also notice that Caterpillar failed to conduct the all-
important consumer surveyCa mistake not likely to be repeated in the latest challenge to an 
unlicensed use of a mark in a Disney films, this one from the Hell’s Angels.  Hells Angels Sue 
Disney on Planned Movie, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at C4.  Indeed, the fact that Caterpillar 
even bothered to bring suit may be more significant than the fact that it lost. 
132. HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 24, at 21 (quoting filmmaker for proposition that “[y]ou 
see everything being blurred now, because for the first time, we’re able to do that technically 
without it being a big deal”).  Reality television has also proved to be a favorite locus for Aidan’s 
other option, product placement.  Amanda Bronstad, Paying for a Place, NAT’L L.J., May 1, 
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trademarks have some special legal statusCi.e., that filmmakers are not free to 
use them as they pleaseCbecause viewers cannot help but notice that a brand 
has been blurred.133
Second, suppose he secures a license as part of a product placement deal 
with the owner of the Red Bull mark.  Such product placement may have once 
been a clandestine form of marketing whose effectiveness depended on its 
ability to promote a product to consumers when their usual skeptical defenses 
against advertising were down.134 But persuasion knowledge studies in the last 
fifteen years repeatedly show that consumers have become more sophisticated in 
interpreting product placement; they have grown aware of the practice and are 
adjusting their attitudes as “active interpreters, not passive receptors of 
encountered brands.”135 Hollywood has adapted as well, making cross-
promotion something it trumpets rather than hides.136 Hit films like The Truman 
Show and Wayne’s World even satirize the (formerly) manipulative nature of 
product placement with jokes that assume audience familiarity with the 
practice.137 In short, today’s audiences have learned to view branded products 
in movies and television programs as more than mere incidental props, and are 
more likely to assume that prominently featured brands are licensed by the mark 
owner. 
Thus doctrinal feedback is born.  Risk aversion and product placement lead 
to more licensing and less depiction of unlicensed brands.  Viewers pick up on 
at least some of these practices, such as increasingly obvious placements and 
eye-catching pixelated images.  Over time, then, consumers come to see 
 
2006, at 1, 18. 
133. Cf. Shelley E. Taylor & Susan T. Fiske, Point of View and Perceptions of Causality,
32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 439, 445 (1975) (explaining strong tendency to draw causal 
inferences from information to which one’s attention is drawn). 
134. Friestad & Wright, supra note 128, at 14; Nelson & McLeod, supra note 129, at 516. 
135. Denise E. DeLorme & Leonard N. Reid, Moviegoers’ Experiences and Interpretations 
of Brands in Films Revisited, J. ADVERTISING, Summer 1999, at 71, 85; see also id. at 78 
(observing that moviegoers in study “were aware of the persuasive intent of brand props”), 85 
(“Our results convincingly demonstrate that moviegoers are more sophisticated in their 
understanding of the practice of brand placement than critics would have public policy officials 
believe.”); Israel D. Nebenzahl & Eugene Secunda, Consumers’ Attitudes Toward Product 
Placement in Movies, 21 INT’L J. ADVERTISING 1, 5-6 (1993) (reporting that college students are 
neutral on whether product placement is unethical and that only 6.7% view it as misleading); 
Sheehan & Guo, supra note 123, at 83 (noting that “audiences grow more aware of product 
placement given its explicit presence in the content, and may develop attitudes toward the 
practice”); Michelle Nelson & Mark Rademacher, How Media Create Persuasion Knowledge: 
An Analysis of Product Placement Coverage in Trade and Newspaper Print Media 16 (Feb. 15, 
2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (noting that media coverage twenty years 
ago was likely to focus on the “newness” of product placement whereas more recent coverage 
assumes that readers “are familiar with the practice”); cf. Paul Siegel, Product Placement and the 
Law, in HANDBOOK OF PRODUCT PLACEMENT IN THE MASS MEDIA 89, 97 (Mary-Lou Galician ed., 
2004) (noting that product placements ma have been clandestine fifteen years ago “[b]ut 
nowadays, audiences are keenly aware of their existence”). 
136. Debra Goldman, Wheels of Fortune, ADWEEK, Apr. 14, 1997, at 62; Sheehan & Guo at 
80. 
137. Siegel, supra note 135, at 97. 
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licensing as the norm: if a brand appears in a film, its owner must have 
consented.  Indeed, some forty-three percent of consumers already regard the 
appearance of a branded product in a television program as an attempt to 
influence the product’s purchase.138 Those giving advice to the major players in 
film and television recognize that this persuasion knowledge implies broader 
trademark rights and act accordingly.  For example, MTV long-form 
programming policy requires pixelation of any prominently featured brand that 
is not part of a product placement deal, so that viewers will not mistakenly think 
that it isCa policy that the network’s intellectual property counsel admits is 
“based largely on a business decision to avoid a risk of claim/litigation and not a 
concrete belief that it’s illegal.”139 Such conservative licensing practices, 
prudent as they may be, push trademark’s entitlement even further into 
previously unregulated territory. 
 
2. Merchandising 
 
The considerable growth of trademark’s reach in the merchandising industry 
over the last thirty years provides another opportunity to study the role of 
persuasion knowledge in doctrinal feedback.  Licensing trademarks for use on 
clothing, keychains, coffee cups, and other assorted merchandise is a multi-
billion-dollar business.  Yet a mark owner’s right to demand payment for use of 
its mark on such goods is of recent vintage and arises from a series of 
ambiguous rulings.140 
The earliest of those rulings looked to licensing evidence in deciding 
whether the mark owner controlled the merchandising market.  For example, the 
first litigation victories for sports merchandising came about because the NFL 
and NHL had each given one manufacturer an exclusive license to make 
embroidered team logos.  When unlicensed companies began to sell the same 
product, the leagues sued.141 In each case, the court attached considerable 
significance to the fact that the leagues had already created and exploited a 
market for exclusive licenses, such that consumers would be confused by 
unlicensed uses142Can implicit recognition that consumers had internalized the 
licensing practices in that industry.  Thus those markets that prominently 
featured “official” merchandise and that did not have a tradition of unlicensed 
competition were fertile ground for claims that all goods bearing a trademark 
had to be licensed.143 
138. Dawn Anfuso, Survey Says: TV Ads Not Dead, IMEDIA CONNECTION, Aug. 22, 2005, at 
http://www.imediaconnection.com/news/6577.asp (last viewed Feb. 13, 2006). 
139. E-mail from Vate Powell, Vice President and Senior Counsel for Intellectual Property 
and Litigation, MTV Networks, to James Gibson, Director of Intellectual Property Institute and 
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law (June 26-27, 2006) (on file 
with author).  Powell also believes that this is “an industry practice and not just ours.”  Id. 
140. See generally Dogan & Lemley, supra note 111. 
141. Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th 
Cir. 1975); NFL Props., Inc. v. Consumer Enters., Inc., 327 N.E.2d 242 (Ill. App. 1975). 
142. Boston Prof’l Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1011; Consumer Enters., 327 N.E.2d at 246.  
143. As one court reluctantly concluded, “Apparently, in this day and age when professional 
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The earliest cases to reject a merchandising claim applied the same principle 
(or, more precisely, its inverse).  Here, the mark owners’ failure to show that the 
market for college paraphernalia and fraternal merchandise was exclusive to 
their licensees doomed their claims.  The absence of such a market meant that 
consumers were accustomed to encountering unlicensed merchandise and thus 
would not mistakenly infer any relationship between the merchandise 
manufacturer and the mark owner simply by virtue of the mark’s appearance on 
a product.144 Again, the importance of persuasion knowledge was clear: 
consumers had learned from the lack of exclusive licensing in those industries 
and formed their expectations accordingly. 
Despite their restrictive holdings, however, the courts that rejected early 
merchandising claims created the potential for a feedback-fueled expansion of 
the trademark entitlement.  They used broad and vague definitions of actionable 
confusion, thereby creating uncertainty as to how far outside their facts the 
holding applied.145 And their narrow rulings often based the rejection of broad 
merchandising rights on the absence of any formal testing of consumer reaction 
to the disputed use, which invited the use of that insidious and circular 
instrument of trademark expansion, the consumer survey.146 Within these 
decisions therefore lurked the danger that the trademark entitlement would move 
further into the merchandising realm, beyond where the case law 
indicatedCeven without any more court rulings or other positivist developments. 
 Exclusive licensing might initially be uncommon in a given market, but over 
time that could easily change, and consumer perception would change with it.  
The shift might begin with symbiotic licensing, as when a merchandiser sees 
value in becoming an “official” licensee.  Other merchandisers might then 
license prophylactically, having recognized the ambiguity of the legal standards 
 
sports teams franchise pennants, teeshirts, helmets, drinking glasses and a wide range of other 
products, a substantial number of people believe, if not told otherwise, that one cannot conduct 
[a state lottery based on NFL games] without NFL approval.”  NFL v. Governor of Del., 435 F. 
Supp. 1372, 1381 (D. Del. 1977); see also NFL Props., Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 
532 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (enjoining unlicensed NFL jerseys); Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) (affirming preliminary 
injunction against use of Dallas Cowboys cheerleaders uniform in adult film); cf. Boston Athletic 
Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1989) (ordering summary judgment against maker of t-
shirts that suggested connection with Boston Marathon). 
144. Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J. H. Ray Jewelry Co., 676 F.2d 
1079, 1083 (5th Cir. 1982) (fraternal merchandise); Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg 
and Co., 633 F.2d 912, 920 (9th Cir. 1980) (same); Board of Governors of the University of 
North Carolina v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (college merchandise); 
University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711, 716 (W.D. Pa. 1983) 
(same).  But see University of Georgia Athletic Ass’n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(finding infringement from use of university mascot on beer). 
145. E.g., Supreme Assembly, 676 F.2d at 1082-83 & n.3 (speaking of confusion as to 
source, endorsement, sponsorship, connection, approval, or “other association”); University of 
Pittsburgh, 566 F. Supp. at 713 (looking for confusion as to “origin, sponsorship, endorsement, 
or any other nature”). 
146. E.g., Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. at 173 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (suggesting that survey like 
that in Wichita Falls would have helped mark owner’s case); University of Pittsburgh, 566 F. 
Supp. at 720 (same). 
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and the risk of an adverse judgment (a risk that would only increase as more 
symbiotic licensing occurred).  Eventually, as consumers encountered more 
“official” licensed merchandise and less unlicensed merchandise, they would 
increasingly come to believe that the law required a license for the use of a mark 
on a given good.  This new persuasion knowledge would then work its way back 
into trademark practice through the law’s use of consumer perception to define 
the entitlement’s reach. 
Thus a feedback effect that got its start through purely voluntary, mutually 
beneficial licensing agreements would pick up speed and extend the reach of the 
entitlement into the sphere of those who would prefer to compete with, not 
contract with, the mark owner.  We saw this feedback effect in the Triangle 
Publications decision discussed above, in which the unlicensed defendant found 
himself stymied by licensing practices that others had eagerly created as part of 
merchandising deals with Seventeen magazine.147 We have also seen that 
feedback was responsible for the first incursions of exclusive rights into the 
realm of professional sports merchandise; the NFL’s and NHL’s success in 
persuading some merchandisers to seek licenses is what ensured their victories 
in subsequent litigation against others. 
In Triangle Publications and the professional sports cases, we can point to 
feedback as the culprit with some certainty because courts explicitly cited these 
licensing markets in crafting their expansive rulings.  The more difficult 
question is whether we can detect doctrinal feedback that never circles back 
around into the positive law.  The development of a vibrant merchandising 
industry suggests that the answer is yes.  Few merchandising cases have been 
decided since the initial wave discussed above.  One statutory change has 
occurred at the federal level (“sponsorship” and “approval” were added to 
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act about a dozen years after the first 
merchandising rulings148), yet this amendment simply codified established case 
law and thus made little difference to positive law as a whole.149 Yet despite 
this relative stasis in the positive law, collegesCwhose attempts to establish 
merchandising exclusivity in court were largely rejectedCnow oversee a billion-
dollar licensing market.150 Indeed, merchandising exclusivity is so widely 
accepted today that police routinely raid unlicensed merchandisers and 
“trademark owners, retail businesses, and even government officials simply 
assume the existence of such a right.”151 Scholars have been at a loss to explain 
these developments.152 If the law has not changed, what has?  The answer, I 
 
147. See supra notes 116-120 and accompanying text. 
148. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, PUB. L. NO. 100-667, ' 132, 102 Stat. 3935, 
3946 (amending 15 U.S.C. ' 43(a)). 
149. Lunney, supra note 88, at 474 & n.353. 
150. 1 GREGORY J. BATTERSBY & CHARLES W. GRIMES, THE LAW OF MERCHANDISE AND 
CHARACTER LICENSING ' 2:16 (2005). 
151. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 111, at 478. 
152. E.g., id. (“The fact that courts are at best evenly split as to whether a merchandising 
right even existsCand even more dubious of its existence in the absence of consumer 
confusionCmakes it all the more surprising that trademark owners, retail businesses, and even 
government officials simply assume the existence of such a right.”) (footnote omitted). 
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submit, is that symbiotic licensing and prophylactic licensing both naturally 
develop in merchandising marketsCthe former driven by promotional 
opportunities and the latter by risk aversion and the indeterminacy of 
infringement’s reach.  Consumer persuasion knowledge develops apace, and as 
consumers develop expectations more favorable to expansive merchandising 
rights, mark users have even more reason to seek licenses, which in turn fuels 
more expansion, and so on. 
 
D. Limitations on Trademark’s Feedback 
Although I hope to have convinced readers by now that doctrinal feedback 
plays a significant and unappreciated part in the expansion of trademark 
entitlements, the phenomenon comes with some caveats.  In this final trademark 
section, I discuss these caveats and explain why they will not ultimately curtail 
trademark’s accretive growth. 
I begin with the limitations of the persuasion knowledge model.  Recall that 
trademark doctrine, unlike copyright doctrine, does not refer directly to 
licensing markets; rather, licensing informs doctrine only through the admittedly 
hazy filter of consumer perception.  The persuasion knowledge model explains 
how consumers come to understand and internalize the licensing practices they 
encounter.  It therefore constitutes a vital part of the feedback loop. 
As we have seen, however, certain licensing practices are easier for the 
consumer to observe and absorb than others, and it is hard to predict with any 
consistency when and how consumers will become aware of licenses in the first 
place, let alone whether that awareness will translate into expansive impressions 
of trademark’s reach.  For example, consumers who encounter a Lakers 
sweatshirt with a prominent “Official NBA Product” label might not notice the 
label at all and thus gain no persuasion knowledge from it.  Of those who do 
notice, some might infer from the label that a license is necessary to produce 
branded merchandiseCan inference that could fuel accretive expansion.  On the 
other hand, other consumers might infer that the label means that the market 
includes unofficial gear tooCotherwise, why would the distinction be made?  
That inference would militate against accretive expansion.  Likewise, a risk-
averse filmmaker may choose to pixelate an unlicensed mark or reach a product 
placement deal to feature it prominently; either use conspicuously implies 
licensing rules that consumers could easily internalize.  But if the filmmaker 
instead relegates the mark to the background or forgoes its use entirely, 
consumers are not likely to gain much persuasion knowledge.  We should 
therefore expect accretive expansion of trademark entitlements to be more 
halting and sporadic than its copyright counterpart. 
Another problem with using the persuasion knowledge model to connect 
licensing practices to consumer perception is that consumers acquire persuasion 
knowledge from sources other than the licensing they encounter.  In one 1983 
poll, 91.2% of respondents agreed that “[n]o product can bear the name of an 
entertainer, cartoon character, or some other famous person unless permission is 
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given for its use by the owner of the name or character”153Can impression that is 
hard to explain based purely on the licensing practices of the time.  Likewise, 
consumers learn about product placement from repeated exposure to it, but they 
also learn from media coverage of the practice, which has increased over the last 
twenty years.154 These extrinsic sources of persuasion knowledge will make 
little difference if they simply reinforce the impressions that consumers get from 
licensing practices.  But if they overstate the prevalence of licensing, they may 
increase the feedback effectCcausing a growth in the entitlement that is neither 
internal to trademark doctrine nor predictive of future expansion.  If they 
understate it, they may slow feedback down, or even cause accretive contraction 
of entitlements. 
Another potential wrench in feedback’s gears is the fact that trademark 
licensing is only partly responsive to trademark doctrine.  Product placement 
deals and the symbiotic licensing we saw in merchandising cases arise not 
because of worries about trademark liability, but because both parties see value 
in cross-promotion.  There is accordingly no guarantee that such licensing will 
arise in any given marketCand without licensing, there is no feedback.  Even 
prophylactic licensing, which is rooted in fear of liability, may not be as strong 
in trademark as in copyright.  Someone selling knock-off Lakers jerseys has 
lower costs than the filmmaker who wants to excerpt four lines from a 
Springsteen song, and in any event is more likely to be a somewhat shady 
character with a high internal discount rate.155 He or she will therefore be more 
willing to roll the dice and risk litigation. 
This does not mean that trademark experiences no doctrinal 
feedbackCtrademark users like our filmmaker will be risk averse, and even a 
risk-neutral actor may choose to seek a license in the face of considerable legal 
ambiguitiesCbut its effect may be less widespread and more attenuated in 
industries that lack strong risk aversion.  We can expect feedback in such 
industries to be particularly dependent on developments in the positive law, 
because the absence of risk aversion means that a licensing culture is unlikely to 
spontaneously arise without an apposite and expansive court ruling or statute.  
Such dependence would not curtail the feedback effect, but it would make it less 
insidious and more like the positivist entitlement expansions on which the 
scholarship usually focuses.156 
153. Stephen H. Harrison, The Merchandising Reporter’s First Consumers Survey on 
Licensing, MERCHANDISING REP., Aug. 1983, at 22, 23-25.  The survey results demonstrate the 
potential for a feedback-fueled expansion of trademark’s cousin, the right of publicity. 
154. Nelson & Rademacher, supra note 135. 
155. See James Cyphers, Companies Join Police in Pursuing T-Shirt Bootleggers, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 4, 1991, at B2 (“The T-shirts are cheap to make, the stolen trademarks are free and the 
risk of getting caught is still low.”). 
156. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 88, at 1697-1705 (discussing the role of positive law in 
trademark’s “doctrinal creep”).  The positive law might also be an additional source of 
persuasion knowledge, but the average consumer is undoubtedly more likely to feel the effects of 
court decisions and new legislation through exposure to updated licensing practices than through 
hearing about them directly.  But see Denicola, supra note 88, at 1667-68 (arguing that 
trademark’s “self-actuated expansion” results from “trademark owners who win enough 
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Finally, even if trademark law contains the seeds of its own expansion, the 
skeptic might argue that another extrinsic influence, the First Amendment, will 
prevent courts from extending the reach of the entitlement, particularly when it 
affects the expressive decisions of filmmakers and other artists.  This is possible, 
but far from certain.  Although trademark law is essentially the regulation of 
expression, it has traditionally withstood constitutional scrutiny because its 
regulations apply only when consumers are deceived, and the First Amendment 
permits regulation of deceitful speech (e.g., perjury and fraud).157 The Second 
Circuit, for example, gave constitutional concerns short shrift when it affirmed 
an orderCa prior restraintCbarring release of the defendant’s film: “The 
propriety of a preliminary injunction where [protection of trademark’s property 
right] is sought is so clear that courts have often issued an injunction without 
even mentioning the first amendment.”158 Given this precedent, the malleable 
definition of actionable confusion, and the low evidentiary threshold for survey 
proof, the First Amendment is not a reliable obstacle to the accretive expansion 
of trademark rights in film and television content.159 
If the First Amendment does not halt the intrusion of trademark into popular 
culture, that intrusion has the potential to fuel feedback in other settings as well. 
 Film and television represent the public’s primary interaction with trademarks 
outside their traditional role as mere indicators of origin.  The persuasion 
knowledge consumers acquire from mass media and its risk-averse, promotion-
minded actors will therefore disproportionately inform their perception of 
trademark rights in broader contexts.  Already sixty-five percent of magazine 
readers think that editorial mentions of a brand are the result of a deal between 
the mark owner and the magazine.160 And product placement is creeping into 
videogames,161 rap music,162 and even novels.163 The practice has even sparked 
a guerilla movement of sorts that encourages the negative depiction of brands as 
 
high-profile cases or brag loudly enough about licensing revenues from ornamental use”). 
157. See Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the 
Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 160-64. 
158. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d 
Cir. 1979). 
159. Contrast this with dilution theory, which is often cited as trademark’s greatest threat to 
free expression and autonomy.  E.g., Denicola, supra note 157, at 195-206 (focusing on dilution 
by tarnishment); see also Smith, supra note 90 (arguing that dilution law already gives trademark 
owners too much control over use of branded products in film).  Trademark dilution, however, 
does not require proof of consumer confusion and thus is more vulnerable to First Amendment 
attack.  The accretive, confusion-based expansion I describe may therefore be more threatening 
to expressive freedom than the positive law of dilution. 
160. The Week, ADVERTISING AGE, Oct. 17, 2005, at 20 (Sheila Dougherty ed.). 
161. Mike Musgrove, Advertisers Are Getting Into the Game, WASH. POST., Mar. 2, 2006, at 
D1. 
162. Krissah Williams, In Hip-Hop, Making Name-Dropping Pay, WASH. POST., Aug. 29, 
2005, at D1; Hank Kim, Def Jam, H-P Explore Branded Music Alliance, ADVERTISING AGE,
Sept. 9, 2002, at 4. 
163. Steven L. Snyder, Note, Movies and Product Placement: Is Hollywood Turning Films 
into Commercial Speech, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 308 (discussing the pre-arranged appearance 
of a Maserati in the novel Power City). 
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a way of resisting the reach of intellectual property rights.164 
In short, despite the preceding caveats, mark owners’ control over use of 
marks in popular culture and elsewhere is likely to grow.  We begin with virgin 
territory, in which those who choose to enter into symbiotic promotional deals 
with mark owners coexist peacefully with those who opted instead for 
unlicensed uses.  But as licensing deals and pixelated brands become more 
pervasive and more apparent to consumers, what was once a voluntary 
relationship between mark owner and user begins to shift.  Consumers draw 
more inferences from the appearance of brands, and their inferences then feed 
back into the legal calculus in which practitioners engage when deciding 
whether to license.  In the end, mark users will have to pay fees to mark owners 
without getting anything out of it but the “right” to use the branded goodCa
“right” for which a license was never needed before. 
 
III. PATENT’S SHORT CIRCUIT 
Like copyright and trademark, patent is home to legal ambiguities, risk 
aversion, costly litigation, severe penalties, and a doctrine that looks to the 
existence vel non of licensing markets in defining entitlements.  Yet because of 
the manner in which these factors interact, and because of courts’ sensitivity to 
their interaction, they do not produce systemic accretion of rightsCdespite the 
fact that unnecessary licensing does take place.  I will therefore spend only a 
short time examining doctrinal feedback in patent law, lingering just long 
enough to learn how licensing information can contribute to intellectual property 
doctrine without causing an accretive expansion of rights. 
The ambiguities that lead to unnecessary patent licenses occur both when 
the law decides whether a patent exists at all and when the law defines the reach 
of a patent.  Take the latter first.  Every patent concludes with one or more 
claims.  Each claim comprises a single sentence that precisely states the 
exclusive right that the patent conveys.165 The idea here is the very opposite of 
ambiguity: the Patent Act requires claims because the patentee and the public 
both need to know precisely where the patent rights begin and end.166 
Unfortunately, in practice the task of claim construction is rife with ambiguity.  
First, reducing a technological concept to words is a chancy thing; the available 
terminology may fail to capture the true nature of the innovation.167 Second, 
courts interpret claims based not on their plain English meaning, but on the 
meaning they would have to a person having ordinary skill in the art (a 
“PHOSITA”)Ci.e., the typical worker in the relevant field.168 Such a 
 
164. RTMARK Projects, Product Disadvertisements in TV and Movies,
http://www.rtmark.com/projects/app/disp (last visited June 7, 2006) (suggesting funding for 
“product displacement” portrayals in which “[t]he FedEx package arrives late and mangled” or 
“someone throws up after eating at McDonald’s”). 
165. 35 U.S.C. ' 112. 
166. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002). 
167. Id. at 731. 
168. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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perspective can be difficult to tease out.  Third, even if the wording manages to 
capture the invention and the PHOSITA’s interpretation is clear, patent’s 
doctrine of equivalents allows a patent owner to reach beyond the literal 
boundaries of a claim to recover from those whose invention operates 
substantially the same way to achieve the same result.169 Like copyright’s fair 
use doctrine and substantial similarity standard, the doctrine of equivalents quite 
reasonably sacrifices bright-line precision for flexibility and fairness.170 But in 
combination with the challenges of terminology and PHOSITA perspective, it 
frequently makes the reach of patent entitlements inherently ambiguous.171 
Ambiguity is also found in the threshold determination of whether a given 
invention is patentable.  The Patent Act grants its protection only to inventions 
that are novel, useful, and nonobvious.172 Of the various sources of 
indeterminacy in this inquiry, the one of interest here is nonobviousness, which 
is widely acknowledged as the most frequent basis for invalidation of 
patents173Cand which, as we will soon see, is the factor that invites licensing 
information into the picture. 
The question in nonobviousness analysis is whether the innovation would 
have been obvious to a PHOSITA given the state of the art at the time of 
invention.174 The primary focus is therefore the content of the prior art, the 
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, and the level of 
ordinary skill in the relevant art.175 The Supreme Court has indicated, however, 
that secondary considerations such as the invention’s commercial success may 
also be relevant to whether the invention was indeed obvious.176 Such 
considerations are helpful because they tend to be less technical than inquiries 
into prior art and are also less susceptible to hindsight bias (an invention 
naturally seems more obvious after it has been invented).177 
The role of secondary considerations is not entirely clear.  The Supreme 
Court has merely held that they “might” be relevant,178 and has subsequently 
implied that they cannot save a patent that otherwise appears obvious under the 
three explicit statutory factors.179 Yet the Federal Circuit has expressly elevated 
their importance, requiring their examination in all cases,180 observing that they 
 
169. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950). 
170. Festo, 535 U.S. at 731-33. 
171. See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An 
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 1105 (2004) (finding 
inconsistency in claim construction); Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal 
Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075 (2001) (same). 
172. 35 U.S.C. '' 101 (useful), 102 (novel), 103 (nonobvious). 
173. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated 
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 208 (1998). 
174. 35 U.S.C. ' 103(a). 
175. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). 
176. Id. at 17-18. 
177. Id. at 35-36. 
178. Id. at 17-18. 
179. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282-83 (1976); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 
219, 230 n.4 (1976). 
180. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re 
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“may often be the most probative and cogent evidence in the record,”181 and 
using them to rescue patents that were “otherwise doubtful.”182
The nonobviousness analysis and the secondary considerations that inform 
it are important for our purposes because one of those considerations is whether 
the patent owner has successfully licensed the invention to others in the 
industry.  If so, the argument goes, they must view the patent as valid; 
otherwise, they would make use of the innovation without bothering to seek a 
license.  And if those in the industry respect the patent’s validity, how can a 
court conclude that it would have been obvious to a PHOSITA?183 
By now, the flaws in this reasoning and its potential for accretive feedback 
should be apparent.  We have already seen that parties often agree to pay for 
copyright and trademark licenses even if they sincerely doubt that they are 
infringing.  The same is true in patent.  Patent infringement litigation is 
notoriously costly, ranging from two to five times as expensive as copyright and 
trademark suits with similar amounts at stake.184 Moreover, like copyright and 
trademark, patent has traditionally been a property-rule regime, with 
supracompensatory damages and injunctions readily available to the prevailing 
rightsholder.185 This means that parties on the fringes of infringement will often 
agree to license even if the reach of the claims or merits of the patent are in 
doubt.  The alternative is to take the chance of costly litigation, an adverse 
judgment, damages in excess of what a license would have cost, and particularly 
the disproportionate leverage that an injunction gives the rightsholderCa
threatening prospect, particularly when the patented technology constitutes but 
one small component of the infringing product.  Defendants with substantial 
investments already committed are unlikely take that chance; they will tend 
instead toward risk aversion.186 
Yet despite these similarities to copyright and trademark licensing, doctrinal 
feedback in patent law exists only in a very limited form and does not lead to a 
systemic expansion of patent’s reach.  This lack of accretive growth results from 
two factors.  First, any feedback from licensing information affects only the 
particular patent being litigated.  The fact that a risk-averse party may have 
secured an unneeded license for Patent X may make it easier for the owner of 
 
Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989, 996 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
181. Stratoflex, 713 F.2d at 1538; accord Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, 
Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 306 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
182. Sernaker, 702 F.2d at 996; accord Stratoflex, 713 F.2d at 1538. 
183. See, e.g., WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (citing licensing as evidence of “industry respect”). 
184. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE 2005 ECONOMIC SURVEY 22 
(2005). 
185. 35 U.S.C. ' 284 (allowing treble damages); W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 
F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (favoring injunctions).  A recent Supreme Court ruling has, 
however, cast doubt on how easily injunctions will issue.  See infra notes 231-232 and 
accompanying text (discussing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006)). 
186. See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic 
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Patent X to stave off an obviousness finding, but it has no effect on whether 
some unrelated Patent Y is adjudged valid.  Doctrinal feedback in patent law 
will therefore not expand the reach of the patent entitlement in general.  In 
contrast, if the owner of a copyright in a photograph succeeds in convincing 
documentarians to seek a license before using the photo in their films, that 
licensing market is relevant to every subsequent fair use dispute between 
photographers and filmmakers, and accordingly has an accretive effect on the 
overall reach of copyright rights. 
Second, and more important for our purposes, courts adjudicating patent 
disputes routinely recognize and account for the possibility that licensing means 
something other than respect for a patent’s validity.  Even those cases that attach 
primary importance to secondary considerations require the plaintiff to prove a 
nexus between the licensing evidence and the merits of the claimed invention;187 
courts understand that patent users might prefer to license rather than litigate 
even a dubious patent, and that patent owners too might opt for a token fee 
instead of a lawsuit in which their patent could be invalidated.188 As we will 
now see, those who view accretive expansion as something to be avoided can 
import this heightened scrutiny into copyright and trademark law and thus short-
circuit their feedback loops, just as patent already short-circuits its own. 
 
IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
A. Do We Care? 
To this point, I have merely described the feedback phenomenon and the 
effects that it has on the reach of intellectual property entitlements.  I will now 
turn to the normative questions: do we care?  Is accretive expansion of 
intellectual property rights a problem?  If so, what are the possible solutions? 
At first blush, one might be tempted to view doctrinal feedback as benign.  
Why would one object to markets that form from voluntary transactions or to 
legal doctrines that measure liability by reference to industry practice?  As 
already noted, commentators from otherwise incompatible camps agree that 
copyright’s fair use doctrine should refer to such practices when defining the 
reach of the entitlement.189 Even among independent documentary 
filmmakersCa community that seems much more likely to be victim than victor 
in the permissions warsCthere is appreciable support for a pro-licensing 
norm.190 Likewise, trademark’s consumer confusion standard enjoys 
widespread acceptance, even if courts do occasionally give it too broad an 
interpretation.  If these reasonable doctrines combine with voluntary exchanges 
 
187. E.g., Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 305-06 & 
n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 1573, 1575 
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189. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text. 
190. AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 28, at 22-25. 
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in the free market to produce an expansion of intellectual property rights, 
perhaps that means that rights should expand. 
No matter what one’s perspective on intellectual property, however, viewing 
doctrinal feedback in this way is overly simplistic.  Take the economic approach 
to intellectual property law, which we might expect to be particularly deferential 
to licensing markets.  A licensing culture that results from risk aversion on the 
part of the licensee and invites strategic holdout on the part of the licensor is 
unlikely to promote overall social welfare, even if the licensing motivations are 
economically rational from the individual parties’ standpoint.191 A market 
formed in the shadow of legal ambiguities, risk-averse actors, and strategic 
bargaining thus tells us little about the entitlement’s optimal coverage.  
Moreover, because intellectual property goods are nonrival, exclusive rights are 
not necessary to ensure that the goods gravitate to their most valuable use; 
instead, exclusive rights merely to provide an incentive to produce the goods in 
the first place.192 On that point, it is doubtful that the marginal, gray-area 
licensing that causes doctrinal feedback has a significant incentivizing effect; 
trademark owners have a considerable incentive to produce and popularize their 
marks for source-identification purposes alone, and the incidental uses that fall 
within fair use’s gray area are unlikely to represent a primary revenue stream for 
copyright owners.  Finally, even if licensing fees are important for incentive 
purposes, the economic approach must recognize that information is both an 
input and an output in the creative process.193 Thus the more licenses an artist 
needs to produce a new work, the more likely he or she is to abandon the 
enterprise entirely.194 The aggregate effect of a licensing culture may therefore 
be an anticommons, with the incentive to produce newer works unduly 
sacrificed at the altar of rewarding older works. 
For those who view intellectual property as something other than a servant 
of market efficiency, the analysis is different but the outcome is the same.  In 
copyright, for example, Wendy Gordon has argued that sometimes “the criteria 
that perfect markets maximize are simply not the criteria of most importance.”195 
And numerous commentators have observed that trademarks frequently assume 
a role in popular rhetoric that has little to do with the cost-lowering, source-
identifying function for which the law provides protection.196 
191. Cf. Gordon, Excuse, supra note 56, at 167 (“Assuming the goal of copyright is to 
achieve maximum social benefit, there is no reason to require a potential user of a work to ask 
the copyright owner’s permission unless there is some way to believe the owner’s self-interest is 
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Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004). 
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194. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 12, at 100-04. 
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From this standpoint, doctrinal feedback is particularly worrisome because 
(as we have already seen) it tends to be most prevalent when mere granules of 
intellectual property appear in transformative works of expression.  When 
filmmakers, writers, and other artists avoid using some of our most meaningful 
cultural referents for fear of being sued, culture suffers.  The effect, like the 
effect of doctrinal feedback itself, accretes incrementally and in varied contexts, 
but is no less real.  Its aggregate impact on creativity may defy empirical 
measurement, but examples abound.  A book focusing on an early twentieth-
century composer was withdrawn from circulation because less than one percent 
of its content comprised the composer’s unpublished work and commentary 
thereon, and  the owner of the composer’s copyright disliked the book’s critical 
take on its subject.197 During the filming of the dancing documentary Mad Hot 
Ballroom, someone spontaneously yelled three wordsC“Everybody dance 
now!”Cfrom a popular song.  The filmmakers had to edit the line out, despite its 
obvious appeal, because the song’s copyright owner demanded $5,000 for a 
license.198 Reticence to use trademarks without a license is equally evident.  
The writer and director of the hit animated film The Incredibles wanted to name 
his bomb-throwing French villain “Bomb Pérignon,” but fear of a lawsuit from 
champagne maker Dom Pérignon prompted a change to “Bomb Voyage.”199 
Artwork depicting a Barbie doll attacked by various household appliances led 
Mattel to file a trademark infringement suit, which the artist was able to win 
only after four years of pro bono representation by the ACLU.200 
Product placement also has a troubling effect on the creative process, 
possibly because it involves payment to, rather than from, the mark user.  As the 
practice has become more prevalent and profitable, even its promoters have 
come to fear that financial temptation will unduly influence filmmakers’ 
creativity.201 Of course, product placement is voluntary, so the market may 
sufficiently regulate its trade-off between financing and creativity: those in the 
industry who are willing to compromise creative choice to secure better 
financing will do so, those who aren’t won’t, and audiences can vote with their 
wallets as to which product they prefer.  The problem, however, is that the 
increasing prevalence of product placement and prophylactic licensing threatens 
to extend trademark’s reach such that there will be no second option; those 
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James Bond movies and other films). 
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filmmakers who prefer to preserve creative freedom and engage in unlicensed 
use of real-world brands will not be able to do so because the law will require a 
license. 
Finally, regardless of whether one takes an economic or non-economic 
approach to intellectual property law, expansion by accretion raises the question 
of how paternalistic the law should be.  One might favor an expansion of 
intellectual property entitlements but still want that expansion to be driven by 
top-down positivist sources rather than bottom-up licensing practices.202 The 
usual argument in favor of bottom-up regimes is that they reflect social values 
more directly than statutes and court rulings; with regard to fair use, for 
example, community practice supposedly represents “an understanding [that] 
may have been developed with an eye to the broader question” of copyright’s 
goals.203 Given the amount of unnecessary licensing that takes place in the real 
world of intellectual property, however, this gives the process too much credit.  
It is less purposeful and more accretive than that.  Licensing regimes and other 
community standards are not static, and they do not spring fully formed from the 
head of the god Equity.  They develop and change over time, informed by legal 
and social norms, in a process that does not necessarily involve any conscious 
policy choice or reflect an optimal outcome.  The law is thus not simply the 
public’s scrivener.  It should lead as well as follow, inform as well as react. 
All told, then, there is reason to believe that expansion by accretion is not a 
good thing.  The more meaningful question, however, is not whether this 
inadvertent expansion represents the best of all possible worlds, but whether its 
various solutions create greater problems than they cure.  The following 
discussion therefore reviews the ways in which we could deal with doctrinal 
feedback and discusses their collateral effects.  We will see that many of the 
solutions are surprisingly counterintuitive (e.g., increasing the complexity of 
intellectual property statutes or encouraging more litigation), and almost all 
come laden with normative implications that make them attractive only to those 
with certain views.  In the end, however, I propose a more normatively neutral 
solution that comprises refinements in how the positive law scrutinizes licensing 
information and consumer motivation without requiring any great doctrinal leap. 
 
B. Reducing Uncertainty 
If those who use trademarks and copyrighted works can more accurately 
predict which uses are within the rightsholders’ control, they will agree to fewer 
unneeded licenses.  Clarifying the gray areas in the law is therefore one obvious 
option for those interested in curtailing the accretive expansion that doctrinal 
feedback produces.  Of course, we may agree that clearer rules are needed, but 
disagree about whether those clear rules should limit entitlements or enlarge 
 
202. Cf. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 111, at 487 (“The real underlying issue is whether the 
trademark law should act here as a creator or as a reflector of societal norms.”). 
203. Weinreb, supra note 57, at 1152; accord Fisher, supra note 27, at 1680-81 & n.100; 
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them.  That issue is for the most part outside the scope of this article.  I will 
point out when a particular solution inherently favors the rightsholder over the 
user, or vice versa, but my overall purpose here is to identify the tools that 
policymakers can use to forestall doctrinal feedback, not to prescribe what to do 
with them. 
 
1. Statutory Standards and Regulatory Rules 
 
One obvious way to clarify intellectual property’s ambiguitiesCwhether 
they originate in code or case lawCis to write more specific rules into the 
governing statutes.  In other words, we can rid intellectual property law of 
ambiguities, and thus curtail doctrinal feedback, by moving from standards to 
rules. 
The rules-versus-standards debate is an old one, in intellectual property and 
elsewhere.  Broadly speaking, rules specify ex ante what conduct is forbidden, 
with only factual determinations remaining ex post: “Do not drive over fifty-five 
miles per hour.”  Standards set forth a more general admonition, leaving specific 
interpretation thereof for later adjudication: “Do not drive at unreasonable 
speeds.”204 Standards provide less ex ante guidance, thus shifting more risk to 
those who operate near their boundaries, but provide more ex post flexibility in 
the individual case.205 
In copyright, the doctrines that produce accretive expansionCthe 
idea/expression dichotomy, the substantial similarity test, and the fair use 
defenseCare all standards.206 Replacing or supplementing them with more 
specific rules would help retard the accretive expansion that doctrinal feedback 
produces.  This would not require an abrupt change in direction; copyright has 
been steadily moving from standards to rules for some time.  Indeed, the history 
of American copyright is essentially an evolution from a broad, industry-neutral 
property right to a set of detailed, industry-specific regulations.207 For example, 
the fair use standard has seen its universality and flexibility become less 
important as parties who would otherwise rely heavily on the doctrineCe.g., 
libraries, archivists, and educatorsChave increasingly operated under safe-
harbor statutes designed specifically for them.208 
Arguing for more regulatory complexity, however, goes against the weight 
of copyright scholarship, which almost unanimously sees increased regulation as 
a tool of rent-seeking industries pursuing a positivist expansion of 
entitlements.209 While this may be true, we have now seen that a less complex 
 
204. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 
559-60 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 959 (1995). 
205. Kaplow, supra note 204, at 605 (“Because individuals tend to be less well informed 
concerning standards, they may bear more risk under standards than under rules . . . .”). 
206. See supra Part I.A. 
207. See Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87 (2004). 
208. E.g., 17 U.S.C. '' 108, 110(1)-(2), 112(f). 
209. E.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1637-38 (2003); Denicola, supra note 88, at 1685-86; Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, 
Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion 44 
 
standards-based regime carries with it its own expansive riskCmore subtle, 
perhaps, but no less threatening.  In fact, expansion by accretion may be more 
threatening, in that by the time it occurs it is so ingrained in industry practice 
that reversing it may prove impossible.  Contrary to the conventional wisdom, 
then, a balkanized, industry-specific code may be a help, not a hindrance, in 
halting the expansion of intellectual property rights. 
For example, suppose we supplement fair use with a rule that no license is 
required for any excerpt of fewer than X words, or X seconds of recorded music. 
 Such a rule may strike academics as simplistic to the point of idiocy, but if real-
world lawyers can’t give advice to mass-market clients at levels significantly 
more sophisticated than that, the current more nuanced standard is no better 
(and carries with it the added potential for doctrinal feedback).  On the other 
hand, any bright-line rule comes with its own problems.  The actual number we 
use for X may be less important than the clarity the rule would provide, but the 
number still matters, and would be another battleground in the war over how to 
balance private incentive and public benefit.  If we choose, say, the number 
fifty, then Robert Frost’s poem Fire And Ice (clocking in at fifty-one words) 
enjoys a protection that Ogden Nash’s The Hippopotamus (forty-six) does not.  
If that seems unfair to Nash, we could change the rule so as not to apply to 
works that comprise less than fifty words.  Even that rule, however, fails to 
recognize that the use of an entire work in an incidental manner, like a photo in 
the background of a film, may be a better fair use candidate than a fragmented 
but purposeful taking.  We could again add caveats and variations to address 
that issue, but the more adjustments we make, the more the rule comes to 
resemble the indeterminate standard we were trying to replace. 
These objections to bright-line rules for fair use would be less problematic if 
the rules were merely safe harbors, giving clarity to those who fall within their 
limits without denying others the right to fall back on the more general 
standard.210 Yet safe-harbor rules (and their close cousin, industry-specific 
“best practices” guidelines) have historically enjoyed mixed success at best.  
Promulgated in a number of copyright contexts, such approaches often end up 
compromising flexibility and adaptability without providing much clarity or 
 
Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 870-79 (1987); Liu, supra note 
207, at 134-39; Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 291-
92 (2004); see also Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in 
Intellectual Property Law 60-62 (Villanova  Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Paper No. 41, 
2005) (arguing that using standards rather than rules reduces copyright’s uniformity costs).  But 
see Shubha Ghosh, The Merits of Ownership; Or, How I Learned To Stop Worrying and Love 
Intellectual Property, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 453, 482 (2002) (arguing that “the family 
resemblance between intellectual property law and tax law need not be bemoaned”). 
210. See Liu, supra note 207, at 141 (noting that industry-specific regulations “do not 
preclude flexibility, insofar as courts remain free to craft additional exceptions through the fair 
use doctrine”); Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of Copyright’s 
Fair Use Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 381 (2005) (arguing that ambiguity 
inherent in fair use “standard” is preferable to more determinative fair use “rule” because fair use 
must be as flexible and generally applicable to serve as counterbalance to broad, technology-
neutral rights that copyright grants to authors). 
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protection for users, as courts convert safe harbors into the only harbors and 
make floors into ceilings and minimums into maximums.211
In contrast to copyright, trademark law has largely avoided regulatory 
complexity, despite having seen its own positivist expansion in recent years.212 
Using statutes to provide predictability for trademark users nevertheless presents 
significant challenges.  Foremost among them is that trademark’s doctrinal 
feedback is based on evolving consumer perceptions.  Legislation alone cannot 
halt this evolution; a statute cannot simply order consumers to stop interpreting 
trademark practices in an expansive way.  Here, however, the same dynamic that 
causes trademark’s doctrinal feedback can cure it.  If consumers learn from 
trademark practices that reflect expansive views of the entitlement’s reach, they 
can learn from practices that reflect narrower views as well.  The law can 
accordingly change consumer perception by changing the legal standards and 
practices that inform persuasion knowledge.  For example, suppose Congress 
adopts a bright-line rule that permits all unlicensed uses of branded goods in 
movies.  At first, such uses might result in confusion, as consumers accustomed 
to seeing only licensed uses infer some connection between the mark owner and 
the filmmaker. 213 But over time, as consumers encounter more and more 
clearly unlicensed uses and see fewer and fewer blurred marks, they will adjust 
their perception to reflect the new licensing reality. 
The question remains, however, whether such bright-line trademark rules 
should favor users or rightsholders.  Converting trademark into a full-fledged 
property right would curtail feedback by severing doctrine from its moorings in 
consumer confusion.  At the other extreme, eliminating dilution and sponsorship 
confusion altogether and requiring proof of confusion as to origin in every case 
would have much the same effect.  More moderate revisions also present 
normative dilemmas.  A single, clear statutory definition of sponsorship 
confusion would rid us of the vague hodgepodge of confusion variations 
(endorsement, association, connection, etc.) and modifiers (of any kind, in some 
way, etc.) that make ex ante evaluation of liability so difficult, and more 
guidance regarding use of survey evidence would help as well.  But what’s the 
“right” definition?  What’s the “correct” percentage of consumers who must be 
confused before a use is considered infringing?  Can the federal government 
impose its answers to these questions on fifty different state trademark regimes? 
 And would rightsholders have too much influence over the formulation of those 
answers, by virtue of their lobbying power? 
In the end, then, one’s normative policy preferences regarding the proper 
reach of intellectual property entitlements will largely determine one’s attitude 
toward whether and how bright-line statutory amendments might limit doctrinal 
feedback.  Those who welcome an expansion of entitlements but who prefer a 
 
211. See HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 24, at 6-7; Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use 
and the Illusion of Fair-Use Guidelines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599 (2001). 
212. See sources cited supra note 87. 
213. As the Supreme Court recently held, preventing consumer confusion is not trademark’s 
only priority; confusion is sometimes the price we pay to achieve other goals.  KP Permanent 
Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121-22 (2004). 
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top-down positivist policy over the accretive effect of licensing practice may 
favor clearer statutory rules.  Those who object to further expansion will be less 
inclined to rely on a legislative process that has facilitated that expansion in the 
past.  In both cases, however, the normative battle over what the rules should 
say may cause more trouble than curtailing doctrinal feedback is worth. 
 
2. Increased Adjudication 
 
In the foregoing discussion, the question of how best to resolve intellectual 
property’s feedback-fueling ambiguities became a question of institutional 
competence: can the legislature clarify the relevant standards without making 
matters worse?  Our inquiry is accordingly not complete without considering the 
ability of other institutions to provide clarity.  The most obvious alternative is 
the judiciary, which has proved itself capable of industry-specific intellectual 
property regulation.214 Courts are a particularly attractive option for those who 
value flexible standards over bright-line rules and who view the legislative 
process as an invitation to rent-seeking that produces both regulatory complexity 
and poor policy results. 
How might the judiciary clarify the ambiguities that cause doctrinal 
feedback?  Two possibilities present themselves.  The first involves explicit 
judicial rulemaking.  In a number of instances, courts have recognized the 
frustrating indeterminacy of intellectual property’s standards and have provided 
bright-line clarity.  To pick one copyright example, the Sixth Circuit recently 
held that the ambiguous “substantial similarity” test is irrelevant in cases 
involving the sampling of recorded music.215 Recognizing that “it would appear 
to be cheaper to license than to litigate,” the court decided to spare samplers the 
“mental, musicological, and technological gymnastics” that the vague standard 
requires and instead impose a bright-line rule favoring licensing.216 And in 
trademark law, the First Circuit realized that evidence of sponsorship confusion 
is essentially circular, in that consumer perception both informs and is informed 
by the law.217 It therefore did away with any need to show that “members of the 
public will actually conclude that defendants’ product was officially sponsored” 
by the plaintiff.218 
Relying on judges to clarify ambiguities requires both a broad view of 
judicial power and confidence in judicial policy judgments.  In each of the two 
foregoing cases, for example, the court arguably crossed the line from 
interpretation to legislation and then reached a poor policy result.219 If curtailing 
 
214. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 209. 
215. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). 
216. Id. at 803. 
217. Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 1989). 
218. Id. 
219. In Bridgeport Music, the court took a statute that makes sound recording copyrights 
less extensive than other copyrights and somehow read it to make sound recording copyrights 
more extensive.  In Boston Athletic, the court essentially jettisoned trademark’s consumer 
confusion standard altogether, a holding with no basis in statute or common law. 
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doctrinal feedback is important enough, perhaps this is the price we pay.  If not, 
however, we may want to consider a second way in which courts can help 
clarify ambiguities.  Recall that risk aversion and other pro-licensing influences 
in key industries mean that relatively few disputes over the reach of copyright 
and trademark entitlements ever make it to court.  Indeed, even in the absence of 
risk aversion, disputants have a suboptimal incentive to litigate a rights-defining 
issue because they bear nearly all the costs of litigation but do not fully 
internalize the benefits; third parties gain valuable knowledge from reading the 
opinion and observing how the case was resolved, without contributing a dime 
toward litigation expenses.220 Combine this lack of litigation with the ambiguity 
of the doctrines that apply when a case actually is litigated and you have a 
remarkable dearth of helpful precedent on which copyright and trademark users 
can rely. 
Courts therefore do not have to replace a vague standard with a bright-line 
rule in order to help curtail doctrinal feedback; rather, every ruling that applies 
the standard helps clarify it.  This suggests that we should encourage more 
frequent rulings on the reach of intellectual property entitlements.  That’s right: 
we need more lawsuits.  Allowing prevailing defendants to recover litigation 
costs from rightsholding plaintiffs might helpCalthough if prevailing 
rightsholders can recover them too, users are not going to be much more likely 
to risk litigation than they are now.221 Public interest groups that now merely 
give advice to copyright and trademark users might focus their resources instead 
on litigating disputes.222 A federal small-claims court focusing on intellectual 
property could be empowered to issue substantive rulings.223 Or a government 
 
220. If an issue is sufficiently important, those with an interest will not be content to sit idle 
and reap informational benefits but will band together to champion their preferred outcome.  
Public choice theory tells us that this is particularly true for highly organized communities or 
industries dominated by a few players because they are better positioned to internalize all of 
litigation’s benefits.  (The recording and movie industries’ unanimity in the file-sharing wars 
comes to mind, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 
(2005), as does the prevalence of amicus briefs in groundbreaking cases.)  But more often 
organizational costs will be too high or the issues too unexceptional.  Some scholars have offered 
solutions to this dilemma in the patent realm.  E.g., Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, 
Incentives To Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office 
Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943 (2004); 
Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents,
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667 (2004); Carl Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis 
and Critique, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017 (2004). 
221. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994) (“[D]efendants who seek to 
advance a variety of meritorious copyright defenses should be encouraged to litigate them to the 
same extent that plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of infringement.”). 
222. See Elaine Dutka, No Free Samples for Documentaries., N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2006, 
' 2, at 16 (discussing coalition of lawyers that donate fair-use advice to filmmakers); Fair Use 
Network, http://www.fairusenetwork.org (providing free advice on uses of intellectual property); 
cf. Anick Jesdanun, EFF Prefers Litigation to Legislation, SALON, July 4,2006, 
http://www.salon.com/wire/ap/D8ILDUDO0.html. 
223. See Remedies for Small Copyright Claims: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
the Internet, and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 29, 2006 (transcript 
available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju26767.000/hju26767_0f.htm); 
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agency might be authorized to issue opinions on particular disputes, in the style 
of SEC no-action letters or IRS advisories224Can attractive option when one 
considers that more litigation alone will do little good if cases settle or are 
resolved on procedural grounds.   Of course, each of these mechanisms 
comes heavily laden with normative baggage.  Public interest litigation, for 
example, is likely to promote pro-user policies, whereas recent Congressional 
interest in a small-claims court seems rooted in concern for copyright owners.225 
Less apparent, but more important, is that an increase in the number of cases 
litigated will have an expansive effect.  Courts are so diffuse and so rarely 
unanimous on gray-area issues that they almost invariably send mixed signals to 
the marketplace.  (In trademark, the problem is particularly acute, because both 
federal and state law govern the reach of entitlements.)  Therefore, unless the 
Supreme Court weighs in, potential licensees with an eye on the national market 
will look to the most conservative rulings, regardless of their source and 
regardless of whether they articulate new bright-line rules or merely apply 
existing standards.  This means that the judiciary’s fitness for reducing overall 
indeterminacy is largely in the eye of the beholder: those who favor expansive 
entitlements will embrace judicial clarification, and those who don’t won’t. 
As promised, then, one’s normative views on the reach of intellectual 
property entitlements will largely determine one’s preferred method for 
clarifying copyright and trademark ambiguities, regardless of whether one 
chooses a statutory or adjudicative solution.  Curing indeterminacy comes 
heavily laden with normative difficulties.  In the next section, we will see that 
the same holds true when we attempt to curtail doctrinal feedback not by 
clarifying ambiguities, but by reducing the severity of the consequences that 
infringing parties face. 
 
C. Reducing Consequences 
Uncertainty regarding the reach of intellectual property entitlements is only 
one of the factors that give rise to unneeded licensing.  An equally important 
factor is the penalty for infringement.  Even in the face of considerable 
uncertainty, a risk-averse user would not hesitate to proceed unlicensed if a 
finding of infringement simply meant the payment of a fair-market licensing fee. 
 In reality, however, the consequences are much more severe.  Remedies in 
copyright cases include not only actual damages, but also statutory damages of 
up to $150,000 per work infringed, disgorgement of profits, and attorney’s 
fees.226 Trademark defendants face similar consequences.227 Making 
supracompensatory damages unavailable or reducing their severity would 
 
Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, A Quick and Inexpensive System for Resolving Peer-to-
Peer Copyright Disputes, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2005). 
224. For this point I’m indebted to Mike Carroll and Shari Motro, each of whom 
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225. See Remedies for Small Copyright Claims, supra note 223. 
226. See sources cited supra note 18. 
227. See sources cited supra notes 112-113. 
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therefore decrease the likelihood that intellectual property users would secure an 
unneeded license, and would accordingly reduce doctrinal feedback even when 
entitlements remain indeterminate. 
To some extent, copyright and trademark law already remove the threat of 
excessive money damages in cases of innocent infringement.228 The real 
sticking point, however, is not monetary remedies but injunctions, which can 
bring high-cost projects to a screeching halt when a rightsholder whose 
intellectual property appears in the work, however briefly, secures an order 
against its release.  This presents a classic holdout problem, as the rightsholder 
demands payment greatly in excess of the value that its intellectual property 
represents to the new project.  If the rightsholder could demand only a 
compensatory licensing fee, its ability to hijack the defendant’s entire 
production process would disappear.  Using some form of liability rule to 
govern copyright and trademark entitlements would therefore go a long way 
toward curtailing the unnecessary licensing that fuels doctrinal feedback.229 
Although of more recent vintage than the rules-versus-standards battle, the 
property-rule-versus-liability-rule debate has been going on for some time in 
intellectual property scholarship.230 Recently the Supreme Court entered the 
debate as well; in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,231 the Court rejected any 
presumption favoring injunctions in patent cases and suggested in dicta that 
such favoritism is also unwarranted in copyright.232 This newfound judicial 
sensitivity to the effect of injunctions suggests that mitigating the consequences 
of infringement is a politically realistic way to curtail accretive expansion. 
One obvious place to start is with preliminary injunctions.  Courts have 
traditionally found such injunctions appropriate “in the vast majority of cases” 
 
228. E.g., 15 U.S.C. ' 1114(2) (trademark); 17 U.S.C. '' 405(b), 504(c)(2) (copyright). 
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230. E.g., BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 73-74 (1966); Ralph 
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231. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).  Even before MercExchange, the Court had hinted that lower 
courts should consider judge-made licenses.  See New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 
505 (2001); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994); Dun v. 
Lumbermen’s Credit Ass’n, 209 U.S. 20, 23-24 (1908).  But see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. 
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985) (“Congress has not designed, and we see no warrant 
for judicially imposing, a ‘compulsory license’ permitting unfettered access to the unpublished 
copyrighted expression of public figures.”). 
232. 126 S. Ct. at 1840-41.  In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy specifically cited the 
holdout problems that arise when injunctions give rightsholders “undue leverage in 
negotiations”Cparticularly if the entitlement covers “but a small component of the product the 
[defendants] seek to produce.”  Id. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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and issue them even absent proof of irreparable harm, as long as the rightsholder 
demonstrates a likelihood of success on the merits.233 Yet preliminary 
injunctions are particularly pernicious because they tend to stop defendants in 
their tracks and bring them to the bargaining tableCthus both creating an early 
opportunity for holdout and keeping cases from reaching a substantive ruling 
that might clarify feedback-fueling gray areas.234 If we removed the categorical 
presumptions in favor of such injunctions, as MercExchange implies should be 
done, intellectual property users would be less likely to engage in gray-area 
licensing and more likely to risk litigation. 
Even if preliminary injunctions were rarer, however, the specter of 
permanent injunctions and supracompensatory damages would cause many 
intellectual property users to embrace unneeded licenses.  The scholarship has 
produced a number of liability-rule proposals that would mitigate this 
tendency.235 Yet whether such a rule is an attractive solution to doctrinal 
feedback depends on one’s normative views on other important intellectual 
property questions. 
For example, a liability rule might produce an increase in litigation over the 
reach of copyright and trademark entitlements: as the threat of injunction 
disappears, users become less risk averse and more willing to roll the liability 
dice.  If so, this would curtail doctrinal feedback in two ways.  First, it would 
create more opportunities for courts to issue substantive rulings, which would 
clarify the legal ambiguities that cause unneeded licensing.  Second, it would 
mean that positive law, in the form of judicial decisions, would play a greater 
role in the valuation of entitlements, displacing the private licensing that fuels 
doctrinal feedback.  Therefore, those who trust courts more than legislatures or 
markets when it comes to entitlement valuation might prefer this outcomeCan 
obvious point, common to any liability rule.  Less obvious is that court-imposed 
licensing would likely have its own expansive effect, because once courts no 
longer confront the all-or-nothing choice that a property rule imposes, they will 
be more inclined to “split the baby” and order moderate licensing fees in cases 
that the defendant would once have won outright.  Any such expansion would 
be positivist, not accretive, but would still trouble those who oppose any growth 
in entitlements. 
Another possibility is that a liability rule would actually increase the 
incidence of private licensing; parties sometimes transact more efficiently in the 
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shadow of liability rules, not less.236 Getting rid of injunctions might make 
rightsholders more willing to offer attractive licensing terms rather than confront 
the uncertainty of court-ordered royalties.237 If so, those who already engage in 
prophylactic licensing might continue to do so, happy to pay less than they do 
now.  Those who cannot currently afford to license, and who must instead alter 
or abandon their projects, might see licensing fees become more affordable.  
Courts would still look to these licenses when determining whether a given use 
is fair, and consumers would still infer sponsorship vel non from the trademark 
practices they encounter. 
Whether this outcome is attractive depends on how accurately the new and 
improved licensing market correlates with overall social welfare.  The market 
would certainly be more representative of true arms-length bargains between 
equals.  But holdout and risk aversion are only some of the inefficiencies that 
intellectual property confronts.  Another is positive externalities: the kinds of 
works at the core of the feedback problemCmovies, music, etc.Cproduce broad 
social benefits that neither party internalizes and that are accordingly not 
captured even in more efficient bargaining.238 Those who consider these 
externalities significant will therefore approve of a liability-rule regime only if it 
discounts monetary damages to account for these hidden values (e.g., by 
expressly allowing for wholly uncompensated uses of copyrights and 
trademarks).239 If courts instead take a one-size-fits-all approachCcharging a 
penurious documentarian the same fee as a major movie studio just because they 
both use the same materialCthen the game may not be worth the candle. 
What this all tells us is that no matter what the effect of a liability 
ruleCmore litigation, more licensing, or bothCits appeal depends on one’s 
normative views  on other topics, just as we saw with previous solutions to 
doctrinal feedback, and the appeal will be greatest to those who favor expansion 
or discount externalities.  The search for a more normatively neutral solution 
continues. 
 
D. Doctrinal Refinements 
We have now seen that clarifying legal ambiguities and reducing the 
consequences of infringement can go a long way toward curtailing doctrinal 
feedback.  Both approaches, however, carry costs that may be unacceptably 
high, depending on one’s normative views on other important intellectual 
property issues.  Moreover, both focus on reducing risk and thus would have no 
effect on the symbiotic licensing markets that can also fuel the feedback loop.  
This final section will therefore discuss how changes in copyright and trademark 
that do not address risk aversion can nevertheless help address the feedback 
problem, and do so in a more normatively neutral way. 
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The most obvious candidates for revision are those doctrines that refer to 
licensing markets: the “market effect” factor in copyright’s fair use defense and 
trademark’s “consumer confusion” cynosure.  As already discussed, however, 
these doctrines enjoy widespread acceptance, and for good reason.  Rather than 
discarding them entirely, then, we should explore ways of making them more 
attentive to the danger of doctrinal feedback.  We want intellectual property 
entitlements to be market-referential without being market-reverential. 
Here we can take a cue from patent law, which manages to refer to licensing 
markets without producing accretive expansion.  Part of the reason that patent 
law is able to pull this off is that its case law explicitly infuses courts with a 
healthy skepticism towards the significance of licensing evidence.240 The cases 
reveal a longstanding practice of discounting licensing information when the 
fees are suspiciously low, the licensing agreement gives the licensee things of 
value besides than the patented technology, or the rightsholder’s market 
penetration is unproven.241 Patent courts know that such licensing often 
indicates not tacit acceptance of a patent’s validity, but a starkly practical 
cost/benefit judgment that it is better to license than litigate. 
The lesson for copyright is clear.  If fair use jurisprudence were to focus not 
just on whether a licensing market exists, but on why a licensing market exists, 
its reliance on private transactions as a proxy for public welfare would make 
more sense.  When licenses are the result of uncertainty as to how far the right 
extends and fear that an expensive project could be held up because of one 
small component, the licenses are not particularly meaningful and other fair use 
factors should carry more weight.  In contrast, when liability is clear and the 
user adds little value (as when an entire work is taken and used in a non-
transformative way), licensing markets should play an important role in the 
analysis.  This jurisprudential change requires no great doctrinal leap; courts 
already recognize that a single defendant’s request for a license is irrelevant 
when the request goes unfulfilled and the defendant subsequently invokes fair 
use.242 All that remains is for courts (or Congress) to extrapolate beyond the 
individual defendant’s case and realize that even when an entire community 
habitually seeks licenses, the resulting market is not always the best measure of 
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the entitlement’s optimal reach.243 
Patent’s approach might not work as well for trademark law.  There are 
some parallels: if courts engaged in a more penetrating inquiry into trademark 
licensing, they would undoubtedly discover that users often secure licenses to 
avoid any risk of litigation or because they receive something other than 
immunity from liability (e.g., product placement financing), rather than because 
the law favors the rightsholder.  But except in its most expansive property-right 
incarnation, trademark law focuses not on the rightsholder’s interests, but on 
consumer perception.  And if consumers expect a given use to be licensed, the 
motivation for the licensing practices that formed that expectation seems 
normatively irrelevant.  Confusion is confusion, and demands a remedy.  For the 
same reason, the liability rules discussed above are poor solutions to trademark 
feedback.  A liability rule would not remedy confusion; it would merely 
compensate the mark owner for confusion’s effects. 
Yet if we focus on motivation of a different sort, we can escape this 
conundrum.  Instead of inquiring into licensing motivation, courts could inquire 
into consumer motivation: does the confusion actually make a difference to 
consumers?  In the classic “passing off” trademark case, we can safely presume 
that confusion is material because marks are one of consumers’ primary means 
of distinguishing between products.  But in cases involving sponsorship, 
approval, and especially permission, the mark’s materiality to the purchasing 
decision is less apparent.  No one watches the Olympics simply because Xerox 
happens to be the sponsor.  And chances are that few people select the movies 
they see or television programs they watch based on what products appear in 
them, even if they assume that the appearances are licensed.244 Mark owners 
should therefore have to show not only that unlicensed uses are confusing, but 
also that that confusion is material to consumers’ economic choices.245 
As with copyright, this doctrinal revision works no great change in the law.  
Several of the narrower merchandising cases rested their holdings on the 
proposition that consumers didn’t care whether the merchandise they purchased 
was “official,” even if they were confused as to whether it was.246 And in a 
 
243. Three court opinions have already flirted with this approach, although two (from the 
same case) lack precedential value.  See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 
F.3d 605, 614-15 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that copyright owner cannot prevent transformative 
fair use through strategic licensing or by pointing to certain users’ willingness to license); 
Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1397 (6th Cir. 1996) (en 
banc) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (“If the publishers have no right to the fee in many of the instances 
in which they are collecting it, we should not validate that practice by now using the income 
derived from it to justify further imposition of fees.”); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document 
Servs., Inc., No. 94-1778, 1996 WL 54741, at *11 (6th Cir. Feb. 12, 1996) (dismissing evidence 
of lost “permission fees” because “[t]he right to permission fees is precisely what is at issue 
here”), vacated, 74 F.3d 1512 (6th Cir. 1996). 
244. See Lemley, supra note 88, at 1707 (recognizing distinction between consumers who 
are not confused “about the relationship between the two products, but nonetheless believe that 
the defendant might have needed a license to use the mark”); accord Dogan & Lemley, supra 
note 111, at 486 n.101. 
245. See Lunney, supra note 88, at 397-98. 
246. Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg and Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 
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recent case challenging the unlicensed use of a mark in a movie, the mark owner 
failed to secure a preliminary injunction partly because the court didn’t believe 
that the appearance of the mark would influence the public’s desire to see the 
film.247 Requiring mark owners to prove this additional element will obviously 
make proving infringement harder, but courts and Congress remain free to 
oversee an enlargement of trademark entitlements through dilution theory and 
the continued viability of broad sponsorship confusion liability. 
In the end, then, encouraging a more penetrating inquiry into the 
motivations of copyright licensees and confused consumers may be the least 
normatively intrusive way to curtail doctrinal feedback and the accretive 
expansion it causes.  No change in the law is entirely normatively neutral, of 
course, and all the solutions we have considered obviously share the normative 
judgment that accretive expansion is a problem.  But the other alternatives, 
although effective, have more serious normative consequences.  That said, those 
who do not fear or mind rent-seeking may prefer the adoption of statutes 
featuring industry-specific, bright-line rules.  Those for whom expansion of 
intellectual property rights is less of a problem than ambiguous standards may 
favor encouraging more litigation.  Those who believe that holdout and risk 
aversion are all that stand in the way of optimal allocation of intellectual 
property entitlements might want to promote bargaining in the shadow of 
liability rules.  In all these cases, the positive law becomes a more active steward 
of intellectual property policy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Doctrinal feedback subtly rigs the intellectual property game in favor of 
rightsholders.  In copyright, it is pronounced, pernicious, and pervasive, causing 
an accretive expansion largely unnoticed in positive law and unappreciated in 
the scholarship.  In trademark, it is more attenuated and limited in effect, but 
nevertheless threatens to extend rightsholder control in surprising and 
worrisome ways.  In patent, it is muted and causes no systemic growth in 
entitlements.248 
1980); Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 
167, 173 (M.D.N.C. 1989); University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 
711, 720-21 (W.D. Pa. 1983).  But see Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 332 
(2d Cir. 1983) (discounting evidence that consumers did not care about perceived association 
between defendant’s product and mark owner). 
247. Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 920 (C.D. Ill. 2003). 
248. Although it is outside the scope of this article, I should point out the feedback potential 
in other areas of the law, particularly those whose doctrines incorporate that famous legal fiction 
and invitation to circularity, “reasonableness.”  Examples include eminent domain’s “reasonable, 
investment-backed expectations,” see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[I]f the owner’s reasonable expectations are shaped by what 
courts allow as a proper exercise of governmental authority, property tends to become what the 
courts say it is.”), the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonable expectations of privacy,” see United 
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Our expectations, and the risks we 
assume, are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the 
past and present.”), and tort law’s “reasonable person”Ca standard that may cause risk-averse 
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No matter what one’s view on the propriety of expanded intellectual 
property rights, the feedback effect is problematic.  Yet when it comes to 
crafting a solution, one’s views matter a great deal, because the most obvious 
cures come laden with normative baggage.  One solution, however, promises to 
remain (mostly) normatively neutral and requires no great doctrinal leap: subtle 
refinements in how the positive law scrutinizes licensing information and 
consumer motivation. 
In the end, there is no panacea for the phenomenon of doctrinal feedback, 
but we can start by promoting awareness of the ways in which risk aversion and 
other pro-licensing factors distort the informational content of the markets on 
which the law relies.  Such awareness will do nothing to halt the positivist 
expansion that troubles so many intellectual property observers, but it will help 
ensure that any expansion in the reach of intellectual property entitlements is the 
result of conscious policy choice and democratic process, not inadvertent 
accretion. 
 
manufacturers to use product warnings that at first appear absurd but whose ubiquity eventually 
causes the public to lower its own estimation of reasonableness, cf. Jane Easter Bahls, Better Safe 
. . . , ENTREPRENEUR, July 2003, at 76 (“CAUTION!  Do NOT swallow nails!  May cause 
irritation!”).  In broad sense, we can even view our democratic system of government as a 
feedback mechanism, as past policies shape the norms that voters and those they elect use to 
decide what to do going forward. 
